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NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Equal Protection-Relatives' Responsibility Statutes do not Create a "Suspect" Classification
Based on Wealth. Swoap v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 490, 516
P.2d 840, 111 Cal. Rptr. 136 (1973).
Two recipients of aid to the aged and their adult children challenged the constitutionality of two state statutes. One imposed a
general duty of support on the children of parents unable to support
themselves.' The other gave county officials a cause of action
against the children to compel contribution to the public assistance
given by the state to the needy parents.2 The petitioners alleged that
the statutes offended the equal protection clauses of both the federal
and state constitutions. The Superior Court of Sacramento County
issued a statewide temporary restraining order barring enforcement
of the two statutes. On appeal the California Supreme Court upheld
the constitutionality of the statutes3 and issued a writ of prohibition
1. "It is the duty of the father, the mother, and the children of any...
person in need who is unable to maintain himself by work, to maintain
such person to the extent of their ability."
Supp. 1974).

CAL.

CIV.

CODE

§ 206 (West

2. "If an adult child living within this state fails to contribute to the
support of his parent as required by Section 12101 [now 12351], the
county [now the statel . . . may proceed against such child. Upon request

to do so, the district attorney or other civil legal officer of the county [now
attorney generall may maintain an action . . . to recover that portion of
aid granted as it is determined that the child is liable to pay, and to secure
an order requiring payment of any sums which may become due in the
future." CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 12100 (West 1972), as amended,
§ 12350 (West Supp. 1974). As of January 1, 1974, old age assistance
programs sharing in Federal revenues must be administered by the state
government, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1381 et seq. (Supp. 1972).
3. 10 Cal. 3d 490, 508, 516 P.2d 840, 852, 111 Cal. Rptr. 136, 148 (1973).
The court does not specify under which constitution it decided the equal
protection question. Although the California constitution does not employ
the phrase "equal protection," the California courts generally equate the
following provisions with equal protection under the United States Constitution: CAL. CONST. art. I § 11. General laws of uniform operation. All
laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation. Id. § 21. Privileges
and immunities. No special privileges or immunities shall ever be granted
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against the Superior Court.
The purpose of the public assistance reimbursement statute was
to relieve the public of the burden of supporting parents with children able to maintain them.' California courts had held that there
was nothing in the challenged duty of support statute, section 206
of the Civil Code, suggesting a legislative intent to impose liability
on a child for public assistance extended to his parents, ' and the
county had no subrogation right to recover aid extended to an
indigent parent.'
Under the Welfare Reform Act of 1971, section 206 was amended
to link the duty of support with the obligation to contribute to
public assistance benefits received by persons in need.' A provision
which may not be altered, revoked or repealed by the legislature; nor shall
any citizen, or class of citizens, be granted privileges or immunities which,
upon the same terms, shall not be granted to all citizens." This is not the
first time that the California court has failed to specify whether its decision
was based on the United States or California Constitution. See Department of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner, 60 Cal. 2d 716, 388 P.2d 720, 36 Cal.

Rptr. 488 (1964), vacated and remanded for clarification, 380 U.S. 194
(1965), decision clarified and adhered to, 62 Cal. 2d 586, 400 P.2d 321, 43
Cal. Rptr. 329 (1965) (basis was California Constitution although the court
had thought United States Constitution equally applicable).
4. Duffy v. Yordi, 149 Cal. 140, 84 P. 838 (1906).
5. County of San Mateo v. Boss, 3 Cal. 3d 962, 970, 479 P.2d 654, 658,
92 Cal. Rptr. 294, 298 (1971); County of Lake v. Forbes, 42 Cal. App. 2d
744, 746, 109 P.2d 972, 974 (1941). The only liability to third persons found
in § 206 (prior to 1971) was on a promise to pay for necessities previously
furnished to the parent.
6. San Bernardino v. Simmons, 46 Cal. 2d. 394, 296 P.2d 329 (1956).
The Swoap court did not override this portion of Simmons. The right to
contribution, the court in Swoap concludes, is derived from the Welfare
and Institutions Code Section 12350 et seq., not from section 206 of The
Civil Code under a subrogation theory. 10 Cal. 3d at 502, 516 P.2d at 848,
111 Cal. Rptr. at 144.
7. "Person in need" was substituted for the words "poor person" by
amendment to section 206 of the Civil Code. [1971] Cal. Stats., ch. 578,
§ 3. The purpose of this substitution was to nullify the decision in County
of San Bernardino v. Simmons, 46 Cal. 2d 394, 296 P.2d 329 (1956), where
the court held that section 206 was not intended to establish the duty of
support referred to in certain enforcement statutes, but was independent
of statutes which require contribution from certain relatives to offset cost
of public assistance programs.
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was added to section 206 defining "a person who is receiving aid to
the aged

.

.

.

to be a person who is unable to maintain himself by

work." I Sections 12350 and 12351 of the Welfare & Institutions Code
provide for enforcement of support duties by the welfare agency
through civil actions for contribution against the responsible relative. '
As of 1971, thirty-two states had statutes which imposed a duty
upon adult children to render support to needy parents.' Although
relative-support statutes have a long history dating back to the
Elizabethan Poor Laws," only the husband's duty to support his
wife and children were enforced at common law. No action against
an adult child for parent-support was recognized.' 2 Most state
8. CAL. CIv. CODE § 206 (West Supp. 1974). The statute, as amended,
continues to provide that a child abandoned during childhood (as defined
in the statute) may be released from his duty to support a parent and any
release under this section is deemed a release from all statutory support
requirements under state law. CAL. CIV. CODE § 206.5 (West Supp. 1974)
provides that: "[alny adult person may file in the superior court of the
county where his parent resides a verified petition alleging that, while he
was a minor, he was abandoned by such parent, and such abandonment
continued for a period of two or more years prior to the time such person
reached the age of 18 years, and such parent during such period was physically and mentally able to support such person, and praying the court to
free such person from the obligation otherwise imposed by law to support
such parent. . . .A person released from the obligation to support a parent as provided in this section shall be deemed to be so released with
respect to any state law. ..."
9. "The granting of or continued receipt of aid shall not be held to be
contingent upon any court action or order or the child's compliance with
provisions of Section 12351." CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 12350 (West
Supp. 1974).
10.

COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, RECIPROCAL STATE LEGISLATION TO

ENFORCE THE SUPPORT OF DEPENDANTS

11.

22 (1971 ed.).

43 Eliz. 1, ch. 2, § 7 (1601), providing that: "[t]he father and

grandfather, mother, and the grandmother, and the children of every poor,
old, blind, lame and impotent person, or other poor person not able to
work, being of a sufficient ability shall, at their own charges, relieve and
maintain every such poor person. . . ." For history of the statute, see

Mandelker, Family Responsibility Under the American Poor Laws, 54
MICH. L. REV. 497, 497-501 (1956).
12. H. CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIC

RELATIONS

212 (1968 ed.).

590
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courts, for policy reasons,"' have not permitted a direct action by a
parent against a child even when the state has created a statutory
duty of support.' 4 Despite reluctance to enforce responsibility statutes, courts have consistently upheld the constitutionality of such
laws against a variety of constitutional objections including lack of
procedural due process,'" claims of discriminatory classification, 6
double taxation," and the taking of private property for public use
without just compensation."'
13. "[Al large body of social work opinion [has long maintained] that
liability of relatives creates and increases family dissension and controversy, weakens and destroys family ties at the very time and in the very
circumstances when they are most needed, imposes an undue burden upon
the poor

. . .

and is therefore socially undesireable, financially unproduc-

tive, and administratively unfeasible." tenBroeck, California'sDual System of Family Law: Its Origin, Development, and Present Status, 17 STAN.
L. REV. 614, 645-46 (1965).
14. Mandelker, supra note 11, at 610-16. In regard to relative responsibility statutes, courts generally have not applied the principle "where
there is a right, there is a remedy." Exceptions do exist. The relative
support statute was enforced against a husband who had otherwise legally
relieved himself of his wife's debts. Cunningham v. Cunningham, 72 Conn.
157, 44 A. 41 (1899). A Georgia court likewise reasoned that a direct cause
of action was created so that a needy mother could compel support from
the estate of her son. Citizens & Southern Nat'l Bank v. Cook, 182 Ga. 341,
185 S.E. 318 (1936).
15. In Mallatt v. Luihn, 206 Or. 678, 294 P.2d 871 (1956), due process
was satisfied where after notice and an opportunity for a hearing is extended to the responsible relative, the county sheriff issues a warrant
which would result in a lien upon the relative's property.
16. Department of Mental Hygiene v. McGilvery, 50 Cal. 2d 742, 329
P.2d 689 (1958), held that all responsible relatives of mentally ill persons
committed to state mental hospitals were treated in the same manner.
Their obligation to support was absolute in each case; it is only the collectibility of the obligation which is contigent upon ability to pay.
17. Maricopa County v. Douglas, 69 Ariz. 35, 208 P.2d 646 (1949),
rejected the argument that paying taxes, a portion of which maintains a
social welfare program, prevents the imposition of a further charge under
the relatives' responsibility statute. Everyone who spends money pays
taxes directly or indirectly. See also Commission v. Eldridge, 7 Cal. App.
298, 94 P.597 (1908).
18. 50 Cal. 2d 742, 329 P.2d 689. The relative receives a substantial
equivalent from the agents of the state having management of the institution. In Mallatt the statute allows collection of court costs from the respon-
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A challenge on equal protection grounds was first heard in
Department of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner,"' where the California
Supreme Court struck down the state's attempt to offset the cost of
maintaining patients in state mental hospitals by enforcing a duty
of contribution against responsible relatives, including adult children." The court reasoned that where the state had undertaken a
program which has elements of a public benefit," it cannot arbitrarily charge the costs incurred to a class of persons who would not
otherwise have the burden of support." The court saw three possible
reasons why equal protection had not been previously argued: first,
the argument is basically invalid;23 second, only now are the courts
giving recognition to an expanded parens patriae principle under
which the state is assuming greater social responsibilities for which
all citizens are contributing through duly apportioned taxes" and
third, the equal protection clause has taken on new vitality because
of recent Supreme Court decisions." While basing its holding on
sible relative. Although this allows collection of an amount greater than
that paid to the recipient, the welfare commission's rights were held to be
subrogated to the recipient's, who would have been entitled to court costs.
19. 60 Cal. 2d 716, 720-21, 388 P.2d 720, 723, 36 Cal. Rptr. 488, 491
(1964).
20. "The husband, wife, father, mother, or children of a mentally ill
person or inebriate . . . shall be liable for his care, support, and mainte-

nance in a state institution of which he is an inmate." [19471 Cal. Stats.,
ch. 625, § 1, (repealed 1969). The basic duty is now found in CAL. WELF.
& INST'NS CODE § 7275 (West Supp. 1974).
21. In this case the "benefit" to society is protection from the insane
but there is further public benefit achieved from rehabilitation of the individual. 60 Cal. 2d at 720, 388 P.2d at 723, 36 Cal. Rptr. at 491.
22. The reasoning of the Kirchner decision was extended in later California cases to preclude the contribution requirement under other relative
responsibility statutes. See County of San Mateo v. Boss, 3 Cal. 3d 962,
479 P.2d 654, 92 Cal. Rptr. 294 (1971) (Old Age Security Law); Dep't of
Mental Hygiene v. Bank of America, 3 Cal. App. 3d 949, 83 Cal. Rptr. 559
(1970) (support of mentally retarded adult child in state institutions).
23. Comment, Compulsory Contribution to Support of State Mental
Patients Held Deprivation of Equal Protection, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 858, 860
(1964).
24. 60 Cal. 2d at 722, 388 P.2d at 723, 36 Cal. Rptr. at 491.
25. See Comment, Equal Protection in Transition:An Analysis and a
Proposal,41 FORDHAM L. REV. 605 (1973).
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equal protection grounds, the court in Kirchnerfailed to specify the
precise way in which equal protection was violated. 2 The statute
was faulted for overbreadth.27 Moreover, the obligation to contribute
was held to be arbitrary since it resulted in the selection of one
particular class of persons for a "species of taxation" with no rational basis to support the classification." However, the persons in
this class and their suspect characteristics were not described.
Rather, the court spoke of the need to reexamine concepts which
upheld the imposition of support liability."9
In an attempt to clarify and give substance to the equal protection
argument, later California cases drew a distinction between a statutory duty of contribution and a "pre-existing" duty of support. The
former are constitutional if they do not expand or extend liabilities
of persons who are "in no other manner" liable for support.' A
husband has a common law duty of support arising from the marriage contract to which he is a consenting party. A statute which
requires him to contribute to the maintenance of a spouse in a state
institution does not violate equal protection guarantees, for it does
not impose a new duty of support." Where a contribution statute
expands the "pre-existing" duty, it fails under the Kirchner reasoning. An example of the "pre-existing" duty standard is County of
San Mateo v. Boss. 2 Here an adult child was held to be under no
obligation to reimburse the county for assistance to his mother who,
although owning a home valued at almost $32,000, qualified for
public assistance as a person "in need." Since the son was not
obliged to support his mother, he had no pre-existing duty of support, and following Kirchner, the county could not compel contribution."3
The "pre-existing" duty standard presents problems for both
its proponents and its critics. If the duty must exist prior to and be
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

See note 3 supra.
60 Cal. 2d at 722, 388 P.2d at 724, 36 Cal. Rptr. at 492.

Id.
Id. at 722, 388 P.2d at 723-24, 36 Cal. Rptr. at 491-92.
In re Dudley, 239 Cal. App. 2d 401, 408, 48 Cal. Rptr. 790, 797

(1966).

31.

In re Guardianship of Thrasher, 105 Cal. App. 2d 768, 234 P.2d 230

(1951).

32. 3 Cal. 3d 962, 479 P.2d 654, 92 Cal. Rptr. 294 (1971).
33. Id. at 969, 479 P.2d at 659, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 298.
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independent of the enforcement statute, is it limited to those duties
found at common law or may it exist in another statute? Is it sufficient that the duty be stated in an independent section of the state
statutes? Proponents of the standard must heed the warning raised
by the dissent in Swoap: "The change in constitutional standards
proposed by the majority removes significant constraints on the
abuse of majoritarian power. . . . [Tihe state may be unfairly

shifting the burden of public expenses onto a small segment of the
citizenry

. . .

a small minority

. ." .with

no cohesive characteristics

that would permit effective political representation." 3 This problem becomes particularly acute where the subject is as politically
controversial as a welfare program. Since prejudices may distort the
reasoning of the majority, some objective limitations on majoritarian power are desirable. However, a "pre-existing" duty rule
which grants validity to so-called "independent" statutory duties of
support fails to provide such an objective standard, since the statutory duties are themselves subject to legislative whim.
A second argument made by the plaintiffs in Swoap was that the
statute created a "suspect" or arbitrary classification based on
wealth. : Since the statute imposed a duty of support only on those
children with needy parents, that is, parents receiving public assistance, these children are singled out to bear an extra burden." Thus,
wealth of the parents is the criterion used to discriminate among
children and to impose arbitrarily an extra burden on some.
34.

10 Cal. 3d at 518, 516 P.2d at 859-60, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 155-56.

35. Id. at 505, 516 P.2d at 850, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 146.

36. Id. The relative's contribution scale was significantly changed in
1971 so as to increase the burden on persons of moderate income. For

example a person with 3 individuals depending on his income who had a
net monthly income of $600 could be required to contribute $25 per month.
Under pre-1971 law, no contribution was required from such a person. "Net
income" is defined to be the sum of income constituting the separate
property of the adult child (excluding community property and earnings
of the spouse) with a fiat twenty-five percent deduction.

CAL. WELF. &

12351 (West Supp. 1974). Both scales are set forth in an
appendix to the majority opinion, 10 Cal. 3d at 508-10, 516 P.2d at 85253, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 148-50. Significantly, the legislature returned to the
pre-1971 scale while Swoap was pending. [1973] Cal. Stats., ch. 1216,
§ 37, urgency, eff. Dec. 5, 1973.
INST'NS CODE §
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Prior to Swoap, in Serrano v. Priest, 17 the California Supreme
Court had held that distinctions made between persons or groups
on the basis of wealth create a "suspect classification." The burden
was placed on the state" to show a compelling reason for a scheme
of financing public education."
The concept of wealth as a "suspect" class was seriously undermined by the Supreme Court in San Antonio School District v.
Rodriquez,"' where Mr. Justice Powell observed that "the wealth
discrimination discovered by . . . [the Serrano court and others]
is quite unlike any of the forms of wealth discrimination heretofore
reviewed by this court." 4 ' He found that these decisions ignore the
"hard threshold questions, including whether it makes a difference
for purposes of consideration under the Constitution that the class
of disadvantaged 'poor' cannot be identified or defined in customary
equal protection terms, and whether the relative-rather than absolute-nature of the asserted deprivation is of significant consequence." 42 Statutes producing an unequal economic burden such as
the graduated income tax, are not unconstitutional per se. Yet a
statute which imposes an equal economic burden on all may be
unconstitutional if the burden effectively denies to one class some
fundamental right,43 or as dicta in Rodriquez suggests, there is a
total deprivation of something less than a fundamental right.4
The court in Swoap was neither willing to examine the burden
which section 12351 imposed upon plaintiffs nor draw any conclusion from the fact that only certain welfare programs carried relative
responsibility provisions. The court's conclusion, that the discrimination was not based on wealth, but parentage, 5 is unconvincing
since only children of poor parents are subject to proceedings under
37. 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
38. Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
39. 5 Cal. 3d. at 610, 487 P.2d at 1259-60, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 619-20.
40.

411 U.S. 1(1973).

41.

Id. at 18-19.
Id. at 19.
43. See Harper v. Virginia Bd. Of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966), where
imposition of a poll tax effectively denied the fundamental right to vote
to poor persons.
42.

44.

411 U.S. at 19.

45.

10 Cal. 3d at 505, 516 P.2d at 850, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 146.
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the statute. Moreover, why discrimination on the basis of "parentage" is any more permissible than "wealth" is not made clear.
Absent the denial of a fundamental right, or finding of a suspect
classification, the court, under the traditional equal protection test,
seeks a "rational relationship" between the purposes of a statute
and the trait which forms the basis of the legislative classification.
While "rationality" has often been based on state interest,46 the
relationship between the classifying criteria and the purposes of the
legislation has not been generally examined. Thus, while states are
not denied the power to treat different classes of persons in different
ways,47 the equal protection clause does "deny the States the power
to legislate that different treatment be accorded to persons placed
by a statute into different classes on the basis of criteria wholly
unrelated to the objective of that statute."48
Recently, the Supreme Court has focused on the relationshipbetween the classifying criteria and the purpose of the legislation. In
Reed v. Reed" the court struck down a state statute mandating that
males be appointed over females as estate administrators. The mandatory preference of males before females, it was argued, expedites
judicial proceedings, thus saving time and public expense. While
governmental efficiency is "rational" and a valid state interest, the
classifying criteria of sex bore no "relation" to the objective of the
statute, which was to qualify administrators."°
Similarly, in James v. Strange" the Supreme Court found that a
statute, designed to recover attorney's fees from indigent defendents, introduced collection procedures less favorable than those
used against other judgment debtors. If the purpose of the statute
was recoupment, then the criteria to be employed must relate to this
purpose. Among judgment debtors no classification resulting in unequal treatment can be made unless the basis of the classification
is a characteristic related to the objective of recoupment.5 2 Because
46.

Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970) (sustaining a state

maximum welfare grant statute).

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 32 (1885).
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-76 (1971).
Id.
Id. at 76.
407 U.S. 128 (1972).
Id. at 141-42.

FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. II

there was no relationship between the classifying element and the
purpose of the statute it was struck'down.
In contrast to these decisions, the Court failed to apply the relationship test in Dandridge v. Williams,53 where the Court upheld a
state statute which imposed a maximum amount on state welfare
benefits to be received by one family. While the general statute sets
out the amount of assistance to be granted to each family, equal
benefits were denied to members of large families. The "reason"
given and accepted by the Court was that the state, which has
limited resources available for public assistance programs, wished
to maximize the number of families to be benefited by the program.54 An obvious alternative-dividing resources available by the
number of eligibles-would achieve the same result without discriminating against large families. The classifying element was not
analyzed in conjunction with the objectives of the statute, which
contained no suggestion that public assistance should be used as a
means of discouraging large families. Justice Marshall dissented on
these grounds:
The Court holds today that regardless of the arbitrariness of a classification
it must be sustained if any state goal can be imagined that is arguably
furthered by its effects. This is so even though the classification's underinclusiveness or overinclusiveness clearly demonstrates that its actual basis is
something other than that asserted by the State. ....
55

As the classifying statutes in Reed and James were judged within
the context of general statutory objectives, so too the relatives' contribution requirements in Swoap might have been held to a similar
standard-that is whether the enforcement conceals a classifying
element unrelated to the objectives of the general welfare statute.
Within the parameters of sections 12350 and 12351 all adult children
of needy parents are treated equitably-contribution is required
according to the child's ability to pay. However, within the entire
state welfare program contribution requirements are imposed on
relatives of some recipients and not on others-the liability being
dependant upon the particular program under which assistance is
given. " The recipients of all programs are as much "in need" as are
53.
54.

397 U.S. 471 (1970).
Id. at 480.

55. Id. at 508.
56.

"No relative, other than the spouse, shall be held to be financially
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the parents of the Swoap plaintiffs. Furthermore, if it could be
shown that children from the poorest backgrounds with the greatest
liabilities are those most often subject to this additional burden,57
states might be subject to an additional standard of justification.
Balanced against the cost and effort of obtaining compliance, and
the adverse effects upon family relationships, the argument should
run against the state.
It is preferable that legislatures recognize the overwhelming disadvantages inherent in enforcement of broad relative responsibility
statutes. New York State replaced its relative responsibility statutes"5 in 1966 with statutes reflecting more closely the common law
duties of support."9 The occasion was the enactment of legislation
under which New York elected to participate in the federal shared
cost medical assistance plan for the needy under Chapter XIX of
the Social Security Act."' Former Governor Rockefeller used this
opportunity to urge total revision of the relative responsibility
statutes. His language reflected concerns expressed by the court in
Kirchner a year earlier in California but obviously considered unimportant by the court in Swoap:
These far reaching limitations on the financial responsibility of relatives for
support of the needy will lift an often heavy burden on those obligated to pay
for assistance under existing state laws. Experience has shown that the financial responsibility of a broad class of relatives, imposed by statute, is more
often a destructive, rather than cohesive, factor in family unity. For the first
time, thousands of men and women in need of assistance can now in dignity

responsible for the cost of health care received by an adult eligible under
this chapter."

CAL. WELF.

&

INST'NS CODE §

14008(a) (West Supp. 1974).

"This section does not impose liability for the care of mentally retarded
persons in state hospitals." Id. § 7275 (West 1972).
57. 10 Cal. 3d at 520, 516 P.2d at 861, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 157 (dissenting
opinion).
58. "The husband, wife, father, mother, grandparent or child of a recipient of public assistance or care or of a person liable to become in need
thereof, if of sufficient ability, is responsible for the support of such person." Law of April 24, 1962, Ch. 686, § 415 [1962]. N.Y. Soc. WELF. LAW
§ 101 (McKinney 1966).

59. "The spouse or parent of a recipient of public assistance or care or
of a person liable to become in need thereof. . . ." N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT
§ 415 (McKinney Supp. 1973). See also N.Y. Soc. WELF. LAW § 101
(McKinney 1966).
60.

42 U.S.C. § 1396 (Supp. 1974).

598
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seek such help without feeling that they are a burden to the coming generation.""

61. Governor Rockefeller's Message to the Legislature, March 9, 1966,
1966 Sess. Laws of New York 2989, 2990 (McKinney). See Jones v. Jones,
51 Misc. 2d 610, 273 N.Y.S.2d 661 (1966).

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Right of Privacy-School Program
Designed to Identify and Provide Corrective Therapy for Potential Drug Abusers Held Unconstitutional. Merriken v. Cressman,
364 F. Supp. 913 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
Plaintiffs, Michael Merriken, an eighth grade student, and his
mother, Sylvia Merriken, sought to enjoin the defendant school
board from instituting a psychological testing and treatment program called Critical Period of Intervention (CPI).l CPI was designed
to identify potential drug abusers at an early age. Once a student
was so identified, a series of corrective steps, such as individual and
group therapy, were to be commenced. The corrective aspects of the
program were to be run by school personnel, including teachers and
guidance counselors.2 The District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania held that the CPI program violated plaintiffs' right to
privacy inherent in the penumbras of the Bill of Rights. Moreover,
the court concluded that defendants were attempting to exercise the
exclusive privileges of parents in areas beyond matters of conduct
and discipline, and that the CPI program was being administered
without the knowing, intelligent, voluntary and aware consent of
either parents or students. The defendants were permanently enjoined from implementing the CPI.
The right of privacy in the marital relationship as a distinct constitutional guarantee was recognized in Griswold v. Connecticut.4 In
Griswold, the Supreme Court reversed a decision of the Connecticut
Supreme Court upholding the constitutionality of a Connecticut
statute which made the use of any drug or article for the purposes
of preventing contraception a crime.' The Court began its analysis
by noting that previous decisions had construed the first amendment to include rights such as freedom of association,' the right to
educate a child in the school of the parent's choice,' and the right
to study any particular subject or foreign language'-none of which
1. Merriken v. Cressman, 364 F. Supp. 913, (E.D. Pa. 1973).
2. Id. at 915-16.3. Id. at 922.
4.

381 U.S. 479 (1965).

5.
6.
7.
8.

State v. Griswold, 151 Conn. 544, 200 A.2d 479 (1964).
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
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are specifically mentioned in the Constitution or the Bill of Rights.'
The reason for upholding these rights was that "[w]ithout those
peripheral rights the specific rights would be less secure."' 0 The
Court recognized the existence of zones of privacy associated with
the first, third, fourth, fifth and ninth amendments. The marital
relationship was included within the zone of privacy created by
several constitutional guarantees.' The Court concluded that the
Connecticut statute unconstitutionally invaded the zones of privacy
which protect the marital relationship.'"
Justice Goldberg, in his concurring opinion, found that the right
of marital privacy, in addition to "being within the protected penumbra of specific guarantees,"'" was a fundamental right with an
entirely separate constitutional basis-the ninth amendment. 4
While Griswold presented a fairly straightforward privacy issue,
many privacy cases do not. Frequently, they involve other rights
which have been held fundamental. An example is Stanley v.
Georgia,' in which the Supreme Court reversed a conviction based
on a statute which made the possession of obscene material a crime.
The obscene material was found in the home of the petitioner by
police while searching for drugs. Although the Court based its reversal on the first and fourteenth amendments, the opinion went on to
say that "in the context of this case-a prosecution for mere possession of printed or filmed matter in the privacy of a person's own
home-that right takes on an added dimension. For also fundamental is the right to be free, except in very limited circumstances, from
unwanted governmental intrusion into one's privacy."'" Thus, al9. 381 U.S. at 482.
10. [d. at 482-83.
11. Id. at 484.
12. Id. at 485.
13. Id. at 487.
14. The test applied by Justice Goldberg in determining the fundamental nature of an asserted right was to "look to the 'traditions and
Icollectivel conscience of our people' to determine whether a principle is
,so rooted [there] . . .as to be ranked as fundamental.' " Id. at 493.
Applying this test to the right of privacy in the area of marital relations,
Justice Goldberg concluded that it was a fundamental personal right. Id.
at 494.
15. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
16. Id. at 564. The Court also stated: "The makers of our Constitution
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though entwined with fundamental first amendment rights, the
Court recognized that the right of privacy was involved. 7
One of the most important privacy cases to be decided in recent
years, and the primary authority for the district court in Merriken,
is Roe v. Wade. 18In Roe the Court affirmed a district court determination that the Texas criminal abortion statute was an unconstitutional violation of the respondent's right of privacy. Although the
lower court had found the right to be within the ninth amendment's
reservation of rights to the people, the Supreme Court found it in
the fourteenth amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action."9 The Court characterized the right of privacy as fundamental and reaffirmed the rule that "[w]here certain
'fundamental rights' are involved . . . regulation limiting these
rights may be justified only by a 'compelling state interest.' "20 However, the Court noted that previous decisions had acknowledged
that some state regulation in areas protected by the right of privacy
is permissible. In Roe, the Court pointed out that regulation was
permissible at the point of viability, subsequent to the second
trimester of pregnancy, where the state's interests in safeguarding
health, maintaining medical standards and protecting potential life
"become sufficiently compelling to sustain regulation of the factors
that govern the abortion decision." 2 ' At that point, the conflicting
individual and state rights must be considered to determine the
proper limit of state regulation.22
Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton,23 while primarily an obscenity
decision, also dealt with the right of privacy. Although the Supreme
• . .conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone-the
most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized man."
Id. quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting).
17. Cf. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 500 (1965) (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
18.
19.

410 U.S. 113 (1973).
Id. at 153.

20. Id. at 155.
21. Id. at 154. The Texas statute did not distinguish between the
trimesters of pregnancy and was therefore held to be unconstitutional.
22. Id. See generally Westin, Science, Privacy, and Freedom: Issues
and Proposals for the 1970's, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 1003 (1966).
23. 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
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Court expressly affirmed the right, some limitations were observed.
The Court stated that the right to privacy included only those rights
which can be deemed fundamental or implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty, and further noted that this class of rights encompasses and protects personal intimacies of the home, the family, marriage, motherhood, procreation, and childrearing.24
25 the
Most recently, in Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur,
petitioners alleged that the mandatory maternity leave rules of their
respective school boards infringed their rights under the equal protection clause. In sustaining their claim, the Supreme Court characterized the violated right as that of "freedom of personal choice in
matters of marriage and family life," 2 not as a right to privacy. As
precedent for this statement, the Court cited a series of cases which
were either explicitly decided upon, or subsequently construed to
support, the individual's constitutional right to privacy.27 The result
of this decision has been to further confuse the status of the privacy
right, and to undermine any attempt to consolidate and define it.
The above decisions illustrate the amorphous nature of the right
to privacy. While some aspects of the right inhere in the individual,
as in Roe, others are inherent in marital and familial relationships,
as in Griswold. The Merriken court recognized that a right of privacy exists in the parent-child relationship. This relationship was
found to be second only to marriage-with privacy inhering in an
equally fundamental way. 2" Having decided that the right was
applicable to the parent-child relationship, the court concluded that
''any invasion of that relationship [is] . . . a direct violation of
24. Id. at 65. But cf. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), where the
Court noted that: "These decisions make it clear that only personal rights
that can be deemed 'fundamental' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty' . . . are included in this guarantee of personal privacy. They also
make it clear that the right has some extension to activities relating to
marriage . . . family relationships . . . and child rearing and education
...
" Id. at 152-53 (citations omitted). The Court distinguished Stanley
v. Georgia on the grounds that the ideas which were communicated in the
instant case were not within the protection of the first amendment, nor
within the protection of the particular privacy of the home.
25.

94 S. Ct. 791 (1974).

26. Id. at 796.
27. Id.
28. 364 F. Supp. at 918.
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one's Constitutional right to privacy.""9 Moreover, neither the
child's status as a juvenile nor as a student affected his ability to
assert his constitutional right to privacy. In so ruling, the district
court followed the principles set down in In Re Gault"' and Tinker
v. Des Moines School District.31
Gault dealt extensively with the procedural due process rights to
be afforded the juvenile in judicial proceedings." The due process
standards established in Gault were identical to those afforded
adults. :':' Tinker involved a school regulation which prohibited the
29. "[Tlhe right to privacy is on an equal or possibly more elevated
pedestal than some other individual Constitutional rights and should be
treated with as much deference as free speech." Id. at 918. See generally
Westin, supra note 22. "In the . . . state of privacy [known as] intimacy,

the individual is acting as part of a small unit that claims and is allowed
to exercise corporate seclusion so that it may achieve that special close,
relaxed and frank relationship between two or more individuals which the
word intimacy conveys in popular 'speech. Typical units of intimacy are
husband and wife, the family, a friendship circle, or a work clique." Id. at
1021. Cf. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), where the Supreme
Court stated that "the marital couple is not an independent entity with a
mind and heart of its own, but an association of two individuals. .

.

. If

the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion ..
Id. at 453.
30. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
31. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
32. The Court first examined the "parens patriae" theory of the juvenile court system and found it constitutionally questionable. "The right of
the state . . . to deny to the child procedural rights available to his elders

was elaborated by the assertion that a child, unlike an adult, has a right
'not to liberty, but to custody. . . .' If his parents default in effectively
performing their custodial functions

. . .

the state may intervene. In doing

so, it does not deprive the child of any rights, because he has none. ...
The constitutional and theoretical basis for this peculiar system is-to say
the least-debatable." 387 U.S. at 17.
33. The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment was held to
require that the child and his parents have both a right to counsel and a
right to express notification of this fact. The Court also held that, absent
a valid confession adequate to support the determination of the juvenile
court, confrontation and sworn testimony were essential for a finding of
delinquency. The constitutional privilege against self-incrimination was
found applicable in the case of juveniles as it is with respect to adults; the
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wearing of black arm bands by students protesting the Viet Nam
War. 4 The regulation was held unconstitutional as a violation of the
student's right of free speech: "[s]tudents in school as well as out
of school are persons under our Constitution. They are possessed of
fundamental rights which the state must respect." 3
Although the child's right to privacy in the parent-child relationship was recognized, the district court did not immediately decide
whether this right had been violated. Rather, the court looked to the
parents' right of privacy and found that the parent had not validly
consented to the infringement of that right. This conclusion was
reached because misleading information concerning the nature and
consequences of the CPI program was given by the school board to
the parents: "the letters to the parents were 'selling devices' aimed
at gaining consent without giving negative information. .

.

."I'

For

a waiver, or consent to relinquishment of a legal right, to be valid
it must be "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a
scope of its protection extends beyond those proceedings which were labeled criminal, and covers all proceedings in which inculpatory statements
may be made. Id. at 49, 56. In addition, these rights were extended to the
juvenile's parents. Thus, by implication, the Court recognized the fundamental nature of the parent-child relationship.
34. The Court found that any action of school officials in their official
capacities was clearly state action within the meaning of the fourteenth
amendment. 393 U.S. at 507.
35. Id. at 511. Cf. Olff v. East Side Union High School Dist., 445 F.2d
932 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1042 (1972), where the court
upheld school regulations establishing dress and grooming codes which
were challenged by a student as violating his right to privacy: "Neither
Griswold or cases akin to Griswold are appropriate here. The conduct to
be regulated here is not conduct found in the privacy of the home but in
public educational institutions where individual liberties cannot be left
completely uncontrolled. . .

."

Id. at 938. In Olff, privacy was invoked to

protect an individual choice-a way of dress. Tinker also concerned an
individual choice-the choice to express certain political beliefs. However, the right asserted in Tinker, unlike that in Olff, was fundamental.
Thus, Olff implicitly viewed the right of privacy as being dependent upon
the existence of some other fundamental right. Arguably, this is the approach that the Supreme Court took in Stanley-where privacy was
included as a supplement to the first amendment. However, the explicit
recognition of the right by the Supreme Court in Roe indicates the inadequacy of this view. See also Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
36. 364 F. Supp. at 919.
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known right or privilege." 7 Thus, knowledge of the existence of a
constitutionally protected right or privilege is an essential prerequisite to its waiver.s The district court looked to United States v.
Brady for its guiding principle. In Brady, the Supreme Court held
that "[wlaivers of constitutional rights not only must be voluntary
but must be knowing, intelligent and done with sufficient awareness
of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences." 3 The
school board, when presenting the relevant facts and consequences
of a psychological testing program to parents, was held to the same
standard as a physician presenting the relevant information to his
patient prior to surgery.4" This test is noteworthy for both its high
standard of consent and its departure from the rationale of previous
cases, which eschewed the formation of a test in favor of a determination made by the trial judge, based on the particular facts and
circumstances of each case and the general principles set forth by
the Supreme Court." Based on this standard, and the absence of a
37. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
38. "[T]he purpose of the constitutional guarantee of a right to counsel is to protect an accused from conviction resulting from his own ignorance of his legal constitutional rights. .

. ."

Id. at 465. This principle has

been followed and expanded upon in a series of Supreme Court decisions.
See Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968) (protection against

illegal search); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968) (right of confrontation
and cross-examination); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970) (right
to jury trial); Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) (right to speedy trial).
The fact that these cases deal with waiver of rights in a criminal proceeding
does not apparently limit their principles to criminal proceedings. The
district court in Merriken noted that the Supreme Court originally dealt
with the question of waiver in a civil context. See Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v.
Public Util. Comm'n., 301 U.S. 292,307 (1937); Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy,
301 U.S. 389, 393 (1937). These two civil cases, in turn, became the basis
for the law concerning waiver of rights in criminal proceedings in Johnson
v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).

39.

397 U.S. at 748.

40.

364 F. Supp. at 920. See Sheerer & Roston, Some Legal and Psy-

chological Concerns About Personality Testing In The Public Schools, 30
B.J. 111 (1971), which the district court relies upon in the formulation
of its test for the required level of consent.
41. The law concerning the amount of information which the physician
must furnish to the patient is itself in a transitional stage. In Canterbury
v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972), the
FED.
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waiver sufficient to meet the Brady criteria, the district court held
that the parent had not waived her right of privacy.4"
The district court criticized the CPI program both for its failure
to define drug abuse and for the vague relationship between the
identification and therapeutic aspects of the program.43 Indeed the
"ultimate use" of the test results and the treatmerlt of identified
students were viewed as being the most serious problem presented
by the program." Stressing the lack of confidentiality of the test
results, the court expressed concern for the potential harm involved
court noted the long-standing rule that a physician has a duty to make a
reasonable divulgence of information to his patient, in order that the patient may give an informed consent to the suggested therapy, and found
an additional duty to disclose both possible choices of therapy and the
dangers inherently and potentially involved. Id. at 782. The court departed
radically from previous decisions on the physician's duty to disclose by
rejecting the rule that the duty depended upon the customs of the physicians practicing in the community. The court looked instead to the patient's right of self-decision, and found that "[tihe test for determining
whether a particular peril must be divulged is its materiality to the patient's decision: all risks potentially affecting the decision must be un-

masked." Id. at 786-87. The scope of the relevant facts to be disclosed was
found to be dependent upon the materiality of the risk. The court's definition of material fact was "when a reasonable person, in what the physician
knows or should know to be the patient's position, would be likely to attach
significance to the risk or cluster of risks in deciding whether or not to
forego the proposed therapy." Id. at 787.
42. 364 F. Supp. at 920.
43. Id. This defect has usually been considered a violation of the due
process clause, based on the principle that no one should be required, at
the peril of life, liberty or property, to speculate on what the state commands or forbids. However, the district court did not characterize this
shortcoming as a violation of due process, nor was it explicitly used as a
basis for the court's ultimate decision. See Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423
(1959); United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954); Lanzetta v. New
Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939); Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385
(1926).
44. 364 F. Supp. at 920. In this regard, one should not forget that drug
abuse generally subjects the abuser to criminal sanctions. Viewed in this
way, the CPI program was designed to identify people who, potentially,
might commit a criminal act. Although the district court considered this
question moot in Pennsylvania, in other jurisdictions this kind of identification would pose its own due process problems.
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in labeling a child as a drug addict. 5
The purpose of the CPI's psychological test was to predict tendencies towards drug abuse. Once identified as a potential drug abuser,
the child would be placed in a category different from other students.' " The therapeutic portion of the CPI program would then
afford these classes distinctly different treatment.47 This classification and different treatment afforded the plaintiffs should have presented the court with a clear equal protection issue-triggering the'
use of equal protection standards. Although the district court in
Merriken did not explicitly refer to this issue, it did note that
"[w]hen a program talks about labeling someone as a particular
type and such a label could remain with him for the remainder of
his life, the margin of error must be almost nil." 48 This approach is
similar to that employed by the Supreme Court in recent decisions. 9
45.

364 F. Supp. at 920.

46.

Id. at 917.

47. Id.
48. Id. at 920. The two means of determining whether a test is reasonably constructed are known as content validation or predictive validation.
The latter method, which the district court employs, requires a showing
that there is a correlation between a candidate's performance on the test
and his actual performance. Chance v. Board of Examiners, 458 F.2d 1167,
1174 (2d Cir. 1972). However, the cases demonstrate a great amount of
variance as to what degree of correlation between test results and actual
performance is considered reasonable. Compare Chance with Baker v.
Columbus Mun. Separate School Dist., 329 F. Supp. 706 (N.D. Miss.
1971), af/'d, 462 F.2d 1112 (5th Cir. 1972).
49. The Supreme Court, in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972),
began to revise the traditional analysis of equal protection questions. Prior
to Eisenstadt, the traditional method made the nature of the right asserted
determinative. A determination that the individual's right was fundamental almost invariably lead to the conclusion that the scrutinized classification was violative of the equal protection clause, since the Court required
the state to show a compelling state interest. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel.
Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Harper v. Board of Elections, 383 U.S.
663 (1966); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). In cases where the
right asserted was not considered fundamental, the discriminatory legislation had only to be reasonably related to the state's purpose in creating
the classes; the burden of proof was placed on the individual. Goesaert v.
Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948). But see Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S.
483 (1954), and Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). Although Eisenstadt
found the individual's right to be fundamental, the compelling interest test
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However, Merriken was not decided on the basis of potential
harm which might result from the labeling of students, but on the
violation of the right to privacy caused by the program.' In voiding
the program, the interest of the state in identifying potential drug
abusers was balanced against the right of privacy-and found
wanting.' The court based the use of a balancing test.on Barenblatt
V. United States,5 2 which dealt with an appeal from a conviction for
contempt of Congress. The petitioner had refused to answer queswas not employed, "because the law fails to satisfy even the more lenient
equal protection standard. . . ." 405 U.S. at 447 n.7. Instead the Court
looked to the premise that "a classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation" and proceed to examine the nexus
between the legislation and its supposed object, and concluded that the
questioned legislation did not rationally operate to achieve its supposed
object. Id., citing Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. at 75-76. More recently, the
Supreme Court has avoided the use of the compelling interest test by
adjudicating claims brought under the equal protection clause as due process questions. Significantly, these cases were decided in the lower courts
exclusively on equal protection principles, where the rights infringed upon
were characterized as fundamental. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972);
Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973). In Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. La
Fleur, 94 S. Ct. 791 (1974), the two petitioners asserted that their rights
under the equal protection clause were violated by the mandatory termination rules and the reinstatement rules of their respective school boards.
The Supreme Court held that both termination rules were violative of the
due process clause. The Court looked to the reinstatement provisions.
While it found one rule to be wholly arbitrary and irrational, the other rule
was upheld as "[slerving the legitimate state interests . . . without employing unnecessary presumptions that broadly burden the exercise of protected constitutional liberty." Id. at 801. Although the individual's right
was fundamental, no reference was made to the compelling interest standard of review. See also Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752 (1973). Here
the court upheld a New York State law which required all persons wishing
to vote in a party primary to register within 30 days of the general election.
This requirement was upheld as being related to the substantial state
interest in preventing raiding and maintaining the integrity of the voting
process. Significantly, at no point did the Court claim this interest to be
compelling.
50. 364 F. Supp. at 921.

51. Id.
52. 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
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tions concerning his participation in, or knowledge of, Communist
party activities while he was attending a graduate educational institution. In holding that the first amendment did not protect the
petitioner, the Supreme Court said: "[w]here First Amendment
rights are asserted to bar governmental interrogation resolution of
the issue always involves a balancing by the courts of the competing
private and public interests at stake in the particular circumstances
shown."" Barenblatt was interpreted by the judge in Merriken as
meaning that "[i]f the Court finds the public need so great and the
invasion minimal, then it could sanction the Program in favor of
public need." 4 In the instant case, however, the balance was struck
in favor of the plaintiff's right of privacy.5 5
In view of the limited scope given the holding in Barenblatt, its
use as authority for the validity of the balancing test employed in
Merriken is questionable." More significantly, both Barenblatt and
Roe, which recently employed a balancing test, first found the right
of the individual to be fundamental and the right of the state to
regulate at some point in time to be compelling. In Merriken,
although the individual's right to privacy was categorized as fundamental, there was no finding of any state interest which approached
53. Id. at 126. The Supreme Court went on to state that this test was
an application of the same principles which gave rise to the compelling
interest test in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
Emphasizing the wide power of Congress to legislate in the field of Communist activity in this country, the Court based this power on "the right
of self-preservation, the ultimate value of any society." 360 U.S. at 128.
In effect, the Court found that the Congress had established a "compelling
state interest," although it did not so label that interest.
54. 364 F. Supp. at 920-21.
55. Id. The danger inherent in this test is its allowance of an unlimited
amount of judicial discretion in the balancing process. Some commentators view this test as a return to the era of substantive due process. See
generally Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade,
82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973), and Tribe, The Supreme Court 1972 Term: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HARV. L.
REV. 1 (1973).
56. The Supreme Court was careful to stress that its holding applied
only to the area of Congressional legislation concerning the Communist
party. "[TIhis Court . . . has upheld federal legislation aimed at the
Communist problem which in a different context would certainly have
raised constitutional issues of the gravest character. 360 U.S. at 128.
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the level of a "compelling interest." In fact, the district court found
that the CPI program affected areas beyond those of conduct and
discipline and was not within the government's power. 7 This finding of a lack of state power, and a fundamental right to privacy
makes the use of a balancing test incongruous."
57. 364 F. Supp. at 922.
58. Under the revised approach to equal protection questions, where
the focus of judicial review would look to the rationality of the means by
which the school authorities seek to obtain this information, and the nature of the individual right asserted is reduced to only one factor to be
considered, this incongruity would be lessened. It would be eliminated if
the Supreme Court's recent treatment of equal protection claims as procedural due process questions is indicative of the premise that the power of
the state to regulate refers only to the propriety of the means chosen, and
not to the subject sought to be regulated. But compare Vlandis v. Kline,
412 U.S. 441 (1973), and Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 94 S. Ct. 791
(1974), with Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-State Actions-Denial of Abortion
by Private Hospital Receiving Federal Financial Support Under
the Hill-Burton Program does not Constitute State Action. Doe
v. Bellin Memorial Hospital, 479 F.2d 756 (7th Cir. 1973).
Plaintiffs, a pregnant woman and her doctor, brought suit to
enjoin Bellin Memorial Hospital from denying her an abortion.'
They alleged that since the hospital received federal funds under
the Hill-Burton Act, and were also subject to state regulation, the
acts of the hospital were taken " 'under color of' state law ' 2 within
the meaning of the Civil Rights Act of 1871,1 and were therefore an
infringement on the plaintiffs' constitutional rights. The district
court agreed and granted a preliminary injunction, which was
stayed by the court of appeals pending review.' The Supreme Court
refused to vacate the stay5 and the appeal was heard by the seventh
circuit. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the hospital's
acts were not state action.'
The question confronted by the court in Bellin was whether the
denial of an abortion by a hospital which was the recipient of federal
funds under the Hill-Burton Act and was extensively regulated con1. In Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 188 (1973) plaintiff doctors were

held to have standing to bring suit because they could be prosecuted under
a Georgia criminal statute which prohibited the performance of elective
abortions. In the instant case, although the physician could not be subjected to any criminal sanctions for performing an abortion, he would be
able to show that he had sustained injuries in that he was being restricted
in his right to practice his profession, and, possibly, would suffer economic
harm. See United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
2. Doe v. Bellin Memorial Hosp., 479 F.2d 756, 761 (7th Cir. 1973).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides: "Every person who, under color of'
any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States
or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress."
4. 479 F.2d at 758.
5. Id. at 758 n.3.
6. Id. at 761-62. On a subsidiary issue the court held that the putative
father's consent was not necessary for the operation. Id. at 758-59. The
United States Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) reserved
decision on the rights of the putative father. Id. at 164 n.67.
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stituted state action and contravened the Civil Rights Act. A
woman's right to an abortion has been recognized by the Supreme
Court as among the liberties protected by the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment.7 The defendant hospital, a private institution, issued regulations restricting abortions performed in the hospital to cases where pregnancy would "seriously threaten the health
or life of the mother, or result in delivery of an infant with grave and
irreparable physical deformity or mental retardation, or if the pregnancy has resulted from legally established rape or incest."' Bellin
Memorial Hospital was one of three hospitals in the area, all of
which were private institutions with restrictive policies regarding
abortions.' After consulting with his patient, Dr. Sandmire determined that she required an abortion which should be performed in
a hospital."'
The fourteenth amendment does not limit private action," but
courts have often found state action in the activities of private individuals or groups. The most obvious examples are those cases where
private parties perform a function which is primarily public, 12such
as running a primary or pre-primary election.' 3 In addition, where
7. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1: "INjor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." In
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) the right to privacy was held to
encompass a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy. For a more com-

plete discussion of Roe, see Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf. A Comment
on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973); Heymann & Barzelay, The Forest
and the Trees: Roe v. Wade and Its Critics, 53 B.U.L. REV. 765 (1973);
Comment, In Defense of Liberty: A Look at the Abortion Decisions, 61

GEO. L.J. 1559 (1973).
8. 479 F.2d at 757-58.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 757.
11. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883).
12. Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880). See also Burke & Reber,
State Action, CongressionalPower and Creditors' Rights: An Essay on the
Fourteenth Amendment, 46 S.CAL. L. REV. 1003, 1042 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as State Action].
13. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944), Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S.
461 (195:3). See also State Action 1050. On the issue of government involve-

ment in private action see Williams, The Twilight of State Action, 41
L. REV. 347 (1963). In Kerr v. Enoch Pratt Free Library, 149 F.2d

TEXAS
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the state acts interdependently with a private party in such manner
that the state "must be recognized as a joint participant in the
challenged activity," state action will be recognized. 4 Thus, in determining whether a hospital's acts are state action it is necessary
to determine the degree of state participation in the hospital's activities and to decide whether the hospital is performing primarily a
public function.
A distinction has been drawn between public and private hospitals."5 A public hospital is established and operated by the government. " The actions of these institutions are clearly actions of the
state. Thus, they may not discriminate in the use of their facilities
or unconstitutionally limit the types of operations which may be
performed.' 7 For example, a city hospital rule forbidding the use of
212, 219 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 721 (1945), the fact that the
Iil)rary was receiving a substantial amount of state funding and was also
subject to state regulation, was held to prove a sufficient nexus so that
state action was found in the operation of the library. See Abernathy,
Expansion of the State Action Concept Under the Fourteenth
Amendment, 43 CORNELL L.Q. 375, 391 (1958); Lewis, The Meaning of
State Action, 60 CoLuM. L. REV. 1083, 1103 (1960); Note, 62 MIcH. L. REV.

1433, 1436 (1964).
14.

Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961).

15.

In Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819),

a distinction between public and private corporations was drawn, "public
corporations are such only as are founded by the government for public
purposes, where the whole interests belong also to the government. If',
therefore, the foundation be private, though under the charter of the government, the corporation is private, however extensive the uses may be to
which it is devoted, either by the bounty of the founder, or the nature and
objects of the institution." Id. at 669. Hospitals took the corporate form
and were divided according to this dichotomy. See Note, The Physician's
!?ight to Hospital Staff Membership: The Public-PrivateDichotomy, 1966
WASH.

L.Q. 485, 486.

16. See 1966 WASH. L.Q. at 486. See also Shulman v. Washington
Hosp. Center, 222 F. Supp. 59, 61 (D.D.C. 1963); Edson v. Griffin Hosp.,
21 Conn. Supp. 55, 58, 144 A.2d 341, 343 (1958); Van Campen v. Olean
Gen. Hosp., 210 App. Div. 204, 205 N.Y.S. 554 (4th Dep't 1924, aff'd per
curiam, 239 N.Y. 615 (1925); Khoury v. Community Memorial Hosp. Inc.,
20:3 Va. 236, 123 S.E.2d 533 (1962); State ex rel. Sams v. Ohio Valley Gen.
Hosp. Ass'n, 149 W. Va. 229, 140 S.E.2d 457 (1965).
17. Hathaway v. Worcester City Hosp., 475 F.2d 701, 706 (1st Cir.
1973).
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its facilities for consensual sterilization has been struck down as
violative of equal protection."s A violation of the equal protection
clause has likewise been found where public hospitals have refused
to perform an abortion."
Finding state action in the acts of private hospitals which receive
a certain amount of government funding has posed greater problems
for the courts. The decisions have not been consistent. Schulman v.
Washington Hospital Center" involved a hospital built by the government and later conveyed to a private corporation. The court held
that "[tlhe fact that a private hospital may receive donations or
subventions from the Government, or compensation from a city or
county for caring for sick or disabled indigent persons, does not
transform it into a public institution."'" However, in Eaton v.
Grubbs,2 a different result was reached. There a private party built
a hospital, to be run for the benefit of the city and county residents
upon the site of a former city hospital. The institution's charter
provided that if the hospital were abandoned the property would
revert to the city. Further, the original board of directors was selected by the city and the hospital had received substantial municipal funds over the years. The hospital's refusal to admit black
physicians to practice was held to be state action. 3
18.

Id.

19. Nyberg v. City of Virginia, 361 F. Supp. 932 (D. Minn. 1973); Klein
v. Nassau County Medical Center, 347 F. Supp. 496 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). In
Klein indigents who were entitled to free medical care under state law were

denied abortions at the medical center. The Commissioner of Social Services ruled that the free medical care to which indigents were entitled did

not include "elective" abortions. The court found that the distinction between elective and necessary abortions was invalid and added "Beyond
that, it may well be that a still more fundamental right is infringed when-

ever an attempt is made by statute or rule to deny, or, as here, substantially to interfere with, the pregnant woman's interest in freely determin-

ing whether or not to bear a child." Id. at 500.
20.

222 F. Supp. 59 (D.D.C. 1963).

21.

Id. at 61.
329 F.2d 710 (4th Cir. 1964).
Id. at 715. The plaintiffs here originally brought suit in Eaton v.

22.

2:3.

Board of Managers of The James Walker Memorial Hosp., 261 F.2d 521

(4th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 984 (1959), and the court in that
case found there was no state action in the hospital discrimination. After
the decision in Burton, supra, the same plaintiffs brought suit against the
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In Bellin, plaintiffs' claim of state action was based on the hospital's receipt of Hill-Burton funds and attendant state and federal
regulation . 2 The Act provides federal funds for public and private
non-profit community hospitals.2 1 States receiving these funds are
required to submit to the Surgeon General a plan establishing an
agency to administer the program" and to select an advisory council
2
The state must also submit a constructo confer with the agencyY.
tion and modernization program," and set out minimum standards
to be maintained by Hill-Burton out-patient facilities." Payments
may be withheld for noncompliance with federal regulations." Further, hospitals receiving Hill-Burton funds must provide a certain
volume of services to indigents.3 '
The leading case involving private hospitals receiving Hill-Burton
same defendants in Eaton v. Grubbs, this time successfully. See Wolfe,
Racial Integration of Professional Associations, 18 U. FLA. L. REV. 490
(1965).
24. 42 U.S.C. §§ 291-291o (1970). Hill-Burton is the popular name for
the statute. See H.R. RE'. No. 2519, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 1558 (1946) for
legislative history of the Act.
25. 42 U.S.C. § 291a (1970).
26. Id. § 291d(a)(1).
27. Id. § 291d(a)(3).
28. Id. § 291d(a)(5).
29. Id. § 291d(a)(6).

30.

Id. § 291g.

31. The duty may be waived if it is a financial impossibility for the
hospital. Id. § 291c(e). The purpose of the Hill-Burton Act, stated in
§ 291(a) is to help the states "to furnish adequate hospital, clinic, or
similar services to all their people." Thus, the Hill-Burton program allocates funds to states and submits hospitals receiving funds under the program to regulations in order to help them carry out public functions. And
where a public function is being performed, state action has been found.
Cf. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113
(1877). 42 U.S.C. § 2000d provides that where federal financial assistance
is given to a program, discrimination on grounds of race is prohibited. This
is because of the public policy against racial classifications; cf. Bolling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). There is a similar public policy against state
infringement on fundamental rights; cf. San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v.

Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). However, in the instant case a hospital which
is performing a public function and receiving federal funds is permitted to
infringe on the woman's fundamental right to make the abortion decision.
See notes 46-47 infra and accompanying text.
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funds is Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital.32 Plaintiffs
sought to enjoin two hospitals from denying black doctors and dentists the use of staff facilities and from refusing to admit patients
on grounds of race.': The court held that the state's participation
through the Hill-Burton program was sufficiently extensive to render the hospital's conduct state action for fourteenth amendment
purposes." Relying on the rationale of Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority," Simkins concluded that the interdependency between the state and private institutions supported a finding of state
action. ' Subsequent cases have followed the reasoning of Simkins."
Bellin, however, distinguished Simkins on its facts and found no
state involvement in "the very activity which is being challenged"-the denial of an abortion." The court found no constitu32.

:33.

323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964).

Id. at 961.

34. Id. at 970. The court also found a portion of 42 U.S.C. § 291e(f) to
be unconstitutional. Id. at 969.
:35. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
36. 323 F.2d at 967. See also, 62 MicH. L. REV. 1433, 1439 (1964).
:37. Cypress v. Newport News Gen. and Non-Sectarian Hosp. Ass'n,

251 F. Supp. 667 (E.D. Va. 1966). Sams v. Ohio Valley Gen. Hosp. Ass'n,

413 F.2d 826 (4th Cir. 1969), where hospital refusal to give staff privileges
to doctors from other counties was found to be a violation of equal protection; Stanturf v. Sipes, 335 F.2d 224 (8th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
977 (1965), where the hospital's refusal to admit plaintiff was upheld. The
court distinguished Simkins on the ground that there a race question was
involved and the constitutionality of 42 U.S.C. § 291e(f) was considered.
However, the court "assumed without deciding" that Simkins is controlling on the issue of whether receipt of Hill-Burton funds makes hospital
action state action. Id. at 226-27. See Annot., 37 A.L.R.3d 645, 663 (1971),
"upon joining the Hill-Burton program, a participating state in effect assumes, as a state function, the obligation of planning for adequate hospital care, and when a state function or responsibility is being exercised, it
matters not for fourteenth amendment purposes that the institution would
otherwise be private: the equal protection guaranty applies."
38. 479 F.2d at 761. This interpretation is arguable. Simkins did indeed
find state action in the mere acceptance of Hill-Burton funds. 323 F.2d at
966; Id. at 971 (dissenting opinion). However, the court did not reach the
question as to whether any action of the hospital was state action. Rather
the Simkins court found that the practice of discrimination was state
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tional impediment to a state policy which "leaves a private hospital
free to decide for itself whether . . . it will admit abortion patients
or to determine the conditions on which such patients will be accepted.' Moreover, the state had not sought to influence the hospital's policy concerning abortions. Quoting Judge Friendly's opinion
in Powe v. Miles, "' the court drew a distinction between general
state involvement with the institution and state involvement with
the specific act:
[Tlhe state must be involved not simply with some activity of the institution alleged to have inflicted injury upon a plaintiff but with the activity that
caused the injury. Putting the point another way, the state action, not the
private action, must be the subject of complaint."

Or as the Bellin court succinctly stated, "the State has exercised no
influence whatsoever on the decision of the defendants which
plaintiffs challenge in this litigation."42
Both Bellin and Powe draw a distinction between general state
involvement and the state's involvement with the challenged practice.1": This distinction has been applied in hospital employee discharge situations" and in student disciplinary proceedings.45 In
these cases, the courts have generally found an absence of state
action since the state was not involved in the discharge or disciplinary proceeding. However, in cases where a hospital receiving HillBurton funds has discriminated on the basis of race, the courts have
found state action and have voided the policy."
action. Arguably this is supported by the history of racial segregation
practiced in the hospitals in North Carolina and the sanction given this
practice by federal regulations permitting the maintenance of separate
facilities for different population groups. Thus, the state and federal government, through their support of the historical practice of the institution
can be said to have furthered the segregation.
39. 479 F.2d at 760.
40. 407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1968).
41. Id. at 81.
42. 479 F.2d at 761.
43. See notes 41-42 supra and accompanying text.
44. Mulvihill v. Julia L. Butterfield Memorial Hosp., 329 F. Supp. 1020
(S.D.N.Y. 1971). However dismissal of an employee must not be based on
grounds of race. Id. at 1024.
45. Grossner v. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 287 F. Supp. 535
(S.D.N.Y. 1968); and Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1968).
46. See note 37 supra and accompanying text.
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These cases raise the question as to whether there are two different state action standards-one applied where a policy discriminates against an identifiable group on the basis of a constitutionally
suspect characteristic," and another applied where a policy prevents the exercise of fundamental rights. The cases reviewed in this
note would tend to indicate the existence of such a distinction. As
one court has recently concluded:
Where racial discrimination is involved, the courts have found "state action"
to exist; where other constitutional claims are at issue (due process, freedom
of speech), the courts have generally concluded that no "state action" has
occurred. These varying results however, may not indicate a difference in the
criteria applied."

The governmental purpose in awarding Hill-Burton funds is to
supply specified medical facilities to all of the people." Thus, allowing a Hill-Burton funded private institution to refuse to admit patients on the basis of race is to deny these facilities to a portion of
the population, frustrating the governmental purpose.' Further, the
government has chosen to supply these facilities through private
institutions and therefore has an interest in maintaining the private
character of these institutions. Discriminatory actions thwart the
state policy of making medical facilities available to all, the action
which the state has undertaken." On the other hand, an institution's personnel procedure would not appear to be state action because it does not interfere with the state's providing medical care
to all the people-that is to say, with the action the state has
undertaken. In these areas, the hospital is functioning as a private
institution and thus, the question of state action is not involved. An
important consideration in favor of this reasoning is that it helps to
meet both aspects of the congressional intent-that medical services
3
be provided for all, and that it be provided by private institutions.1
47.

Cf. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).

48. Statler v. Smith, No. 73-1543 (2d Cir., decided April 5, 1974).
49. 42 U.S.C. § 291(a) (1970).
50. Id.
51. Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital, 323 F.2d 959 (4th
Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964).
52. Cf. Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1968); Browns v. Mitchell,
409 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1969); Bright v. Isenbarger, 314 F. Supp. 1382 (N.D.
Ind. 1970), aff'd, 445 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1971).
53. 42 U.S.C. §291(a) (1970).
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This analysis poses several problems, most notably with respect
to a hospital's policy regarding the types of services to be offered.
Did congress intend that all practicable services be provided to all
people, or merely that no person may be discriminatorily denied a
service which is offered? In Bellin the challenged hospital policy
concerned the type of services to be offered."4 In deciding that state
action was not involved, the court implicitly held that Congress'
''action" was merely to provide that all people receive any offered
medical service and that no person be denied a service for reasons
of race or alienage. How far this reasoning can be extended is an
open question-could a hospital arbitrarily refuse to perform a service which it is fully capable of performing? Since the policy in Bellin
concerned abortions-a procedure which the hospital was capable
of performing, at least one court has answered in the affirmative. 5
One doubts the efficacy of reaching a similar result where a hospital
serving a predominantly black community refuses to treat sickle cell
anemia or where a hospital has a policy of refusing to perform the
test for taysachs disease. A further problem arises in those areas
where the state has mandated that certain services be provided.
Here the state has undertaken to provide a service to all people and
a hospital's denial of that service could, under this analysis, be held
to be state action. The problems raised by the court's decision in
BelIin are more interesting than the conclusions reached. Future
cases will have to resolve the problems which the court's analysis
raises.
54.

479 F.2d at 761.

55. Recently Congress enacted legislation which provided that a HillBurton hospital's refusal to grant an abortion shall not be held to be state
action, 42 U.S.C.A. § 3000a-7 (Supp. 1974). This statute, while in accord
with the reasoning of Bllin should not affect a determination of' state
action. State action turns on the extent of involvement with the challenged
activity-it is a factual question and one which Congress cannot resolve

by legislative fiat. One court, however, has relied on this enactment and
has held that state action is not present. Watkins v. Mercy Medical Center, 364 F. Supp. 799 (D. Idaho 1973).

FEDERAL REVENUE SHARING-Classification of Funds
-Enforceability of the Restrictive Spending Provisions of the
Federal Revenue Sharing Act. Mathews v. Massell, 356 F. Supp.
291 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
In Mathews v. Massell,' Mayor Massell and the city Board of
Aldermen of Atlanta passed a resolution whereby 4.5 million dollars
received under the federal revenue sharing plan were applied toward
the payment of firemen's salaries, a priority expenditure under the
Revenue Sharing Act.' They further resolved that the general city
funds released as a result of federal aid would be transferred to a
fund for the payment of a water/sewer rebate to certain individuals
and firms having water accounts with the city.3 This latter provision
was a non-priority expenditure under the Act.
These actions by the city administration prompted a class action4
1. 356 F. Supp. 291, 293 (N.D. Ga. 1973). Resolution adopted at a
meeting of the Board of Aldermen of the City of Atlanta on December 18,
1972.
2. Revenue Sharing Act § 103(a)(1)(A), 31 U.S.C.A. § 1222(a)(1)(A)
(Supp. 1973).
3. Resolution adopted at a meeting of the Board of Aldermen of the
City of Atlanta on February 5, 1973. 356 F. Supp. at 293. "The water/sewer
reduction, or rebate, is not in any way tied to the amount of water consumed. Rather, each water/sewer account, whether residential, commercial or industrial, is to be given the same rebate, amounting to $44 over a
period of 11 months." Id. at 293 n.1.
4. There were preliminary obstacles which the court had to overcome
before it could proceed to the central issue in this case. Initially, it had to
be determined whether the plaintiffs had sufficient standing to bring this

suit, as taxpayers, against the City of Atlanta. It was incumbent upon
plaintiffs to establish a personal stake in the controversy and demonstrate
financial injury in order to have standing as taxpayers. Doremus v. Board
of Educ., 342 U.S. 429 (1952). The court took note that the "requisite
personal stake is more easily demonstrated in a taxpayers' action against
municipal spending than in actions against state or federal legislation. . . ." 356 F. Supp. at 295. The court found the requisite harm in
§ 123(a)(3) of the Revenue Sharing Act which in summary provides for a
penalty to be paid to the federal government in an amount equal to 110
percent of any amount expended out of the federal funds in violation of
any provision of the Revenue Sharing Act. Consequently, the taxpayers of
Atlanta could be forced to pay a penalty if the city administration was
found to have violated the provisions of the Revenue Sharing Act. 356 F.
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by Atlanta taxpayers challenging the manner in which the federal
revenue sharing funds were to be appropriated. Specifically, the
class action challenged the propriety of evading the guidelines set
out under the Act by the transfer of funds from one account to
another. The court held that the city plan entailing the expenditure
of federal funds for a water/sewer rebate violated the priority restrictions in the Act and permanently enjoined the defendants from
utilizing the federal funds in accordance with the city's resolutions. '
The Revenue Sharing Act of 1972 was a response to the financial
Supp. at 296. Secondly, it had to be determined if this action fell within
the jurisdictional requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970) which confers
jurisdiction only if the controversy in question exceeds $10,000. Since it is
obvious that no individual member of the class will suffer financial injury
in excess of $10,000, the issue is whether the claims of the members may
be aggregated to satisfy the jurisdictional requirements. Citing Snyder v.
Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 335 (1969), the court found the applicable principle
of law which provided that the claims of individual members of a class
could be aggregated "in cases in which two or more plaintiffs unite to
enforce a single title or right in which they have a common and undivided
interest." Id. at 335. Commenting that it was the character of the right
asserted which is essential in determining whether individual claims could
be aggregated, the court concluded that the plaintiffs were not challenging
the assessment of taxes but were only seeking to insure that the federal
funds would be spent in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Therefore, this was ruled to be a public right held in common and indivisible.
The requisite financial injury was demonstrated as previously discussed
and therefore the court concluded that the aggregation of plaintiffs' claims
was proper. 356 F. Supp. at 297. Subsequent to this court's ruling on the
issue of standing the Supreme Court in Zahn v. International Paper Co.,
414 U.S. 291 (1973) ruled that multiple plaintiffs with separate and distinct claims must each satisfy the jurisdictional amounts of $10,000 in
order for there to be a class action. It would seem that if this decision came
down prior to the Mathews decision the court would have been compelled
to reach a different conclusion on the issue of aggregation, for Judge Freeman states that "jilt is . . . clear however, that no single member of the

class will stand to suffer in the amount of $10,000." 356 F. Supp. at 297.
In light of Zahn it is apparent that Mathews would not be maintainable
today assuming plaintiffs chose the same course of action.
5. 356 F. Supp. at 302.
6. An Act to Provide Fiscal Assistance to State and Local Governments, to Authorize Federal Collection of State Individual Income Taxes
and for Other Purposes, Pub. L. No. 92-512, 86 Stat. 919, 31 U.S.C.A.
§§ 1221-63 (Supp. 1973) [hereinafter cited as Revenue Sharing Act].
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troubles of state and local governments. The increasing demand for
public services resulting from the substantial increase in urbanization and the inability of local governments to tax those persons
availing themselves of services provided by the local governments
spurred Congress to create a new and fundamentally different kind
of federal aid for state and local governments.'
Prior to the passage of the Revenue Sharing Act, the federal government provided substantial aid to local governments in the form
of categorical aid which generally had to be spent for narrowly prescribed purposes.' Litigation arising out of these categorical aid programs was characterized by broad judicial review of the acts of
officials administering the program to insure compliance with the
provisions of the legislation under which the programs operated. For
instance, courts have reviewed the decision-making processes of an
official administering a federally funded program9 and the right of

7.
CONG.,

See

STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION,

1ST SEss.,

93D

GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE STATE AND LOCAL FISCAL

ASSISTANCE ACT AND THE FEDERAL-STATE TAX COLLECTION OF

1972 (Comm.

Print 1973).
8. Id.
9. Brooks v. Volpe, 350 F. Supp. 269 (W.D. Wash. 1972). The court
reviewed an order by the Secretary of Transportation authorizing the use
of federal funds for a road building project without ascertaining if there
was any prudent or feasible alternative for the use of the land. The court
in reviewing the scope of defendant's authority, found that he exceeded his
authority and abused his discretion in reaching a decision without the
prescribed procedure for making such decisions. See also Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971). Petitioners, a
group of private citizens and local and national conservation organizations,
brought suit in a district court in Tennessee seeking to halt highway construction through a park. The district court, taking a narrow view of its
power to review, had granted defendant's motion to dismiss. 309 F. Supp.
1189 (W.D. Tenn.), aff'd, 432 F.2d 1307 (6th Cir. 1970). The Supreme
Court reversed and remanded with instructions to review the Secretary of
Transportation's decision, stating in part: "Even though there is no de
novo review in this case . . . the generally applicable standards . . . re-

quire the reviewing court to engage in a substantial inquiry. Certainly, the
Secretary's decision is entitled to a presumption of regularity. .

.

. But

that presumption is not to shield his action from a thorough, probing, indepth review." 401 U.S. at 415 (citations omitted).
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a director to dismantle a federally funded agency."' In addition, at
least one court has required findings of fact to facilitate its review
of an administrator's decision."
One of the motivating forces of revenue sharing was the desire to
provide state and local governments with federal funds which could
be expended, within the broad categories of the Act, 2 for what local
officials viewed as their most urgent needs. An analysis of the legislative history of the Revenue Sharing Act and the court's decision
in Mathews reveals that the court has continued the policy of close
judicial review of administrative decisions disbursing federal funds
provided by revenue sharing.
The Revenue Sharing Act was designed to help state and local
governments meet their financial burdens through aid from the federal government. The funds distributed to the state and local governments under the Act were to be used only for the priority expenditures defined in the Act.' 3
10. Local 2677, AFGE v. Phillips, 358 F. Supp. 60 (D.D.C. 1973). A
consolidated action by representatives of the employees of OEO against its
Director. Plaintiff attempted to enjoin the defendant from effectively dismantling OEO by failing to include monies for its operation in the federal
budget. The court reviewing the Director's exercise of discretion found that
he had abused and exceeded his authority: "The OEO Director has been
granted discretion in the disbursing of funds so as to effectuate the goals
of the program. But discretion in the implementation of a program is not
the freedom to ignore the standards for its implementation." Id. at 77
(citation omitted). The court ruled that all acts of the Director designed
to dismantle OEO to be null and void. Id.
11. Board of Pub. Instruction v. Finch, 414 F.2d 1068 (5th Cir. 1969).
Plaintiff petitioned for a review of a HEW decision to cut off payment of
federal funds under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(a)
(1970), as a result of plaintiff's failure to comply with guidelines specifying
an acceptable pace of desegregation. The court in vacating the HEW order
remanded the case for further proceedings requiring HEW to present findings of fact indicating the grounds for the termination of federal funds.
Clearly, the court wants to be acquainted with the facts on which HEW
based its decision so as to facilitate a thorough judicial review of its decision.
12. Revenue Sharing Act § 103(a), 31 U.S.C.A. § 1222(a) (Supp.
1974).

13. The Act provides: "In general.-Funds received by units of local
government under this subchapter may be used only for priority expenditures. For purposes of this chapter, the term 'priority expenditures' means
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From the inception of the Act both houses of Congress recognized
that it would be difficult to trace the federal revenue sharing funds
to the state and local levels. After much debate on this issue, the
Senate committee noted that since there was no requirement that
the state and local governments maintain their prior levels of
budget expenditures, no efficient way existed to determine if the
federal funds were being spent on the priority items designated in
the statute.14 The committee concluded that federal, state and local
funds would be untraceably commingled," thus allowing circumvention of the restrictions imposed under the Act by shifting funds
from one account to another.'" As a result of these findings, the
Senate bill provided that the state and local governments be given
a free hand and be permitted to use their discretion 7 in allocating
only-(1) ordinary and necessary maintenance and operating expenses
for-(A) public safety (including law enforcement, fire protection, and
building code enforcement), (B) environmental protection (including sewage disposal, sanitation, and pollution abatement), (C) public transportation (including transit systems and streets and roads), (D) health, (E)
recreation, (F) libraries, (G) social services for the poor or aged, and (H)
financial administration; and (2) ordinary and necessary capital expenditures authorized by law." Id.
14. S. REP. No. 1050, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1972). "The committee
believes that the State and local governments will be able to make the
most efficient use of the aid funds if they are given the authority to determine how these funds are to be used. . . .[T]he adoption of high priority
items in the House bill merely results in substantially complicating the
mechanics of the aid program without any real substantive effect on spending by the local governments. A complicated and elaborate procedure
would be required to determine that the local governments spend the aid
funds only on the high priority items. However, since the local governments are not required to maintain the level of their own prior expenditures on the high priority items (i.e. expenditures financed out of their own
revenue sources) as a practical matter, they could arrange to use the aid
funds to increase their spending for other than high priority items. As a
result, provision for the high priority categories, at best, is illusory." Id.
15. It is true that state and local governments are not required to
maintain prior levels of budget expenditures under the Act thereby facilitating the commingling of federal, state and local funds. However, the
defendants failed to foresee the vigor with which the court would enforce
the purposes of the Revenue Sharing Act.
16. See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
17. Id.
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the federal funds received under the Act. In effect, the Senate
wanted to provide federal funds without directing how they should
be allocated.
The House of Representatives,' 8 felt it was essential to maintain
some control over the disbursement and allocation of federal revenue sharing funds at the state and local levels. The House version
of the Act"' contained priorities for the allocation of federal funds
disbursed under the Act.20 The House indicated that these funds
should be used for high priority social and economic needs. To insure such use, restrictions were placed on local allocation of the
funds.2'
The final bill was a compromise2 2 of these conflicting views.2" The
Act as passed contained an expanded list of priority items for
which federal funds could be allocated and included the accounting
procedures recommended in the House version of the bill.24 After its
H.R. REP. No. 1018, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 11 (1972).
19. Id. at 18.
20. Id.
21. See note 18 supra.
22. S. REP. No. 1229, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
18.

23. 118 CONG. REC. 9743 (daily ed. October 12, 1972) (remarks of
Representative Mills). "The Senate bill contains no guidance as to how the
local governments are to spend the amounts distributed to them under the
bill. This is in marked contrast with the House bill which requires local
governments to spend the aid funds on a specified list of high priority
items. This, of course, is in accord with the principle that if the Federal

Government is to provide aid to the local governments, it should provide
guidance as to how the funds are to be spent. The objective is to insure

that the funds shall be spent for socially useful puposes which have a high
priority among the various public needs. In view of the importance of

providing Federal guidance as to the spending of local aid funds your
conferees were adamant that the bill should provide such guidance. As a
result, the conference report contains a specified list of priority expenditures on which local governments can spend the aid funds. Under the
conference report, the list of priority expenditures is expanded to include
necessary maintenance and operating expenses for health, recreation, libraries, social services for the poor and aged and financial administration,
which were not included in the House bill. In addition, under the conference bill, all ordinary and necessary capital expenditures authorized by
law-and not just a limited group-are treated as priority expenditures or,
in other words, as permissible expenditures for local government." Id.
24. 31 U.S.C. § 1224(a)(1) (Supp. 1972). See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM.
ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION,

92D

CONG.,

2D SESS.,

GENERAL EXPLANA-
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passage, one commentator suggested that the restrictive provisions
of the Act would be impossible to enforce25 since federal revenue
sharing funds would be hopelessly commingled with state and local
funds, " thus making the priority list in the Revenue Sharing Act
nothing more than a list of recommended uses for funds. 7
Mathews presented the first test of the validity and enforceability
of the restrictions placed on federal funds by the Revenue Sharing
Act. The defendants contended that they had complied with the
regulations" by applying the federal funds received toward the payment of firemen's salaries,20 a priority item under the Act. Defendants also claimed that the general city budget funds freed as a
result of receiving federal aid were not regulated"0 by the Act, and
consequently could be allocated for any purpose the City deemed
appropriate,31 including the proposed water/sewer rebate.
TION OF THE STATE AND LOCAL FISCAL ASSISTANCE ACT AND THE FEDERALSTATE TAX COLLECTION OF

1972 (Comm. Print 1973). The Act provides that

each state and local government is to submit an annual report for each
entitlement period to the Treasury Department. Each report is to set forth
the purposes for which the amounts received during an entitlement period
have been spent or obligated and the amount spent or obligated for each
purpose. In addition, the proposed expenditures for forthcoming general
funds must be submitted in order for a state or local government to receive
funds for that period. Failure to comply with the accounting procedures
of the Act could result in the withholding of funds. 31 U.S.C.A. § 1243(b)
(Supp. 1973). The guidelines for the accounting procedure to be followed
were promulgated by Secretary of the Treasury, George P. Schultz, at 31
C.F.R. § 51.10 (1973) which in addition to the certification requirements
necessitates each recipient government to make public through the news
media a copy of the report submitted to the Secretary of the Treasury. Id.
§ 51.11.

25. Comment, The Revenue SharingAct of 1972: United and Untraceable Dollars from Washington, 10 HARV. J. LEGuS. 276 (1973).
26. "State and local governments can effectively avoid the restrictive
provision by commingling the federal revenue sharing funds with their own
revenues. Although Section 123(a)(1) provides for the deposit of all shared
revenues in a locally established trust fund, funds are commingled in use,
no matter how the books are kept." Id. at 284.
27. Id. at 286.
28. 356 F. Supp. at 299.
29. Revenue Sharing Act § 103(a)(1)(A), 31 U.S.C.A. § 1222(a)(1)
(A) (Supp. 1973).
30. 356 F. Supp. at 299.
31. Id.
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The court agreed that defendants had complied with the requirements of the Act by using federal funds for a priority item. The court
also agreed that the released funds of the general city budget were
not regulated by the statute.3 2 However, in commenting on the unregulated freed funds and their relationship to the total city budget,
the court noted that:
There is a clear difference, however, between funds which are legitimately
freed up by the designation of federal Revenue Sharing funds to provide
municipal services which otherwise would have to have been paid for out of
general City funds, and funds which are transferred from one account to
another simply to avoid the restrictions imposed by § 103(a) of the Act. 3

Even though the court acknowledged that the defendants complied with the letter of the law, it refused to sanction the attempted
evasion of congressional intent by what it called "sham transactions."3 The court noted that the judiciary had frequently looked
to the substance of the transaction rather than its label to determine
if the transaction in question fell within the scope of activities Congress was seeking to prevent.35 It was only after much debate in
Congress that the final version of the Revenue Sharing Act was
passed with restrictions on the discretion a state or local government
could exercise in the allocation of federal funds."
The court's review of the legislative history of the Act placed
special emphasis on the insistence37 of the House of Representatives,
in the face of Senate opposition,3" that priorities be established for
allocation of federal funds. This was interpreted as an indication
that Congress never intended the priorities to serve merely as guide32. Id. On its face, the court's acknowledgment of the defendants' compliance with the letter of the law would appear contrary to the court's
holding in the case. What the court had conceded is that although the
defendants' method of avoiding the restrictive provisions of the Act was
not expressly prohibited, they were nonetheless evading the congressional
intent evident in the creation of federal revenue sharing which clearly
sought to prevent the spending of federal funds on what the Congress
considered to be non-priority items.
33. Id.
34. Id.

35.

Id. at 299-300.

36.
37.
38.

Id. at 300.
Id.
See note 14 supra.
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lines which state or local governments, in the exercise of their discretion, could disregard. The defendants' contention that the priorities were only suggested guidelines was inconsistent39 with the time
spent by Congress in debating the merits of establishing priorities
for the allocation of federal funds and the resulting compromise on
this issue. 4 This appears to be the correct view since the debates
indicate that Congress was fully aware of the ease with which the
restrictions could be circumvented, and in anticipation of attempted abuses enacted sanctions4 1 and accounting procedures4" to
insure compliance with the guidelines. The legislative history of the
Act makes it abundantly clear that Congress never intended the
restrictive provisions of the Act to be interpreted in such a way as
to lend support to the ruse of transferring funds from one account
to another in order to evade the purposes of the statute.
The Mathews decision is the first judicial statement concerning
the restrictive use of federal revenue sharing funds. However, it
should be noted that the shifting of funds in Mathews was not a very
sophisticated attempt by a local government to evade the purposes
of the Act. The defendants never seriously disputed that they intended to allocate the freed city funds to a non-priority item,4 3 and
they in fact provided much of the evidence proving plaintiff's allegations." Defendants contended that this was a permissible allocation
of city funds since the Revenue Sharing Act did not impose any
restrictions on these freed funds.45 As a result, plaintiffs were not
confronted with the difficult task of tracing the federal funds and
the items for which they were expended.
Undoubtedly, the courts will encounter situations where the obstacle in enforcing the restrictive provisions of the Act will be in
establishing that federal funds were, in fact, commingled with state
or local funds. It has been suggested that extensive commingling of
federal, state and local funds will successfully thwart any effort to
identify the federal funds and the purposes for which they were
39.

356 F. Supp. at 301.
See note 23 supra.
See note 24 supra and 31 U.S.C.A. § 1243(b) (Supp. 1973).
See note 24 supra.
43. 356 F. Supp. at 299.
44. Id. at 302.
45. Id.
40.
41.
42.

630
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spent." The court in Mathews was not confronted with a problem
of proof, and this problem will present a substantial obstacle for
future plaintiffs and courts. Nevertheless, the message to state and
local government is clear: federal revenue sharing funds are to be
allocated in accordance with the restrictive provisions of the Act
and courts will not permit congressional intent to be ignored by
means of sham transactions. 7
46.
47.

See Comment, note 25 supra, at 284.
356 F. Supp. at 299.

INCOME TAX-Franchising-Advertising and Promotional
Costs in Market Development. Briarcliff Candy Corp. v.
Commissioner, 475 F.2d 775 (2d Cir. 1973).

Since the latter part of the 19th century, the taxpayer,' Briarcliff
Candy Corporation, manufactured and sold candy and confectionery products. Retail sales to customers in Briarcliff's stores (located
in a number of northeastern cities) represented 80 percent of total
sales, while sales to wholesale customers (primarily department
stores) accounted for the remaining 20 percent. During the 1950's,
a major demographic shift' from urban to suburban areas occurred,
causing Briarcliff to lose its established clientele. The company's
initial response to this loss was to open suburban branches of its
retail operation, but this venture failed because of high operating
costs and low margins of profit.
In the latter part of 1961, having failed in its suburban store
venture, Briarcliff began soliciting independently operated retail
outlets, such as pharmacies and card stores, to serve as franchiseedistributors of Briarcliff's products. To this end a franchise' division
1. Taxpayer was previously the Loft Candy Corp. which, when purchased in 1971 by Barricini Stores, Inc., was renamed Briarcliff Candy
Corp.
2. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, POCKET DATA BOOK, USA 1971, at 41,
Table 8 (1971). "Metropolitan area residents comprised 140 million in
1970, an increase of 17% from 1960, almost entirely in the suburbs." Id. at
5.
3. Franchising accounted for at least $131 billion in annual sales in
1971, "equal to 13% of the Gross National Product and 35% of retail sales."
U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, FRANCHISE OPPORTUNITIES HANDBOOK, at XIV
(June 1972). For a discussion of the various aspects of franchising and its
effects on various elements of law and society, see Caine, Termination of
Franchise Agreements: Some Remedies For Franchisees Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 3 CUMBERLAND-SAMFORD L. REV. 347 (1972); Covey,
Franchisingand the Antitrust Laws: Panaceaor Problem? 42 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 605 (1967); Johnson, The New Tax Treatment of Franchise Payments: The Proposed Regulations Under Section 1253, 47 Los ANGELES B.
BULL. 222 (1972); H. KURSH, THE FRANCHISE BOOM 4 (1962); McGuire,
Labor Law Aspects of Franchising,13 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 215 (1971);
Zeidman, Antitrust Aspects of Franchising,45 MICH. STATE B.J. 27 (1966);
Note, Antitrust Law-Tie-Ins-Chicken Delight "Per Se" Doctrine Extended to DistributorshipFranchise, 4 SETON HALL L. REV. 610 (1973);
Comment, Franchisesand Founders' Contracts: Securities or Not? 8 IDAHO
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was established within the Briarcliff organization and an extensive
advertising campaign, designed to promote franchise contracts,4
was begun. The franchise contracts were to remain in effect for
terms varying from one to five years and thereafter from year to year
unless terminated by either party on thirty days notice.
Briarcliff deducted the cost of the advertising campaign as an
ordinary business expense in computing its net operating loss.' This
deduction was challenged by the IRS and disallowed by the Commissioner. The Commissioner held that the expenditures were capital invested for the purpose of acquiring franchise outlets, and thus
were capital expenditures which are not deductible as ordinary business expenses.' Moreover, since the franchises were capital assets
with an indefinite life, depreciation and amortization were not allowed. 7 The tax court agreed with the Commissioner,' holding that
the advertising campaign was directed not at the promotion of a
product for current sales, but rather at establishing new channels
of distributionl-an asset which would be of benefit to the business
L. REV. 146 (1971); Address by Jerome L. Fels, P.L.I. Conference in N.Y.C.
on Business and Legal Problems of the Franchise,Agency Problems of the
FranchiseAgreement, Sept. 27, 1968; Address by Bernard Goodwin, P.L.I.
Conference in N.Y.C. on Business and Legal Problems of the Franchise,
The Franchise as a Security, Sept. 27, 1968; Address by T. Newman Lawler, P.L.I. Conference on Business and Legal Problems of the Franchise,
Tax Consequences of FranchiseAgreements, Sept. 27, 1968.
4. The retail store proprietor agreed to set aside a space in the store
for refrigerating display and storage counters exclusively devoted to Loft's
products, at his own expense, and to use his best efforts to sell these
products to his customers. Taxpayer agreed to supply the retailer with its
candies at a discount from retail prices and to assist the proprietor in
setting up and operating the facility. It also agreed not to enfranchise a
competing store within a specified area. The storeowner received a commission on his retail sales of the product.
5. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 162(a).
6. Id. § 263.
7. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3.
8. Briarcliff Candy Corp., 41 P-H TAX CT. MEM. 179 (1972).
9. "Franchising basically is the granting by a company of a right to an
individual to distribute the goods of that company often within a given
territory. It is a method of distribution." Garlick, Pure Franchising,Control and the Antitrust Laws: Friends or Foes? 48 J. URBAN L. 835, 837
(1971). A more definitive analysis of the nature of a franchise is found in
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in future years."' The tax court concluded that the contracts obtained represented those channels of distribution and were capital
assets." The taxpayer appealed this decision, and the second circuit
reversed and remanded for modification in Briarcliff v.
Commissioner.2
Advertising expenses generally qualify as allowable deductions
under section 162(a) of the 1954 code. 3 In order to qualify the exthe Franchise Competitive Practices Act of 1967. There are six basic elements: 1) there must be some type of contract or agreement, express or
implied, oral or written; 2) this contract defines a commercial relationship
either for a definite or an indefinite period of time; 3) there is a grant to
the franchisee of the right to distribute the goods of the franchisor; 4) the
franchisee operates an independent business while remaining a component
in the franchisor's distributive system; 5) the franchisor's trademark or
tradename permeates the whole franchise (note that this is lacking in the
Briarcliff case); 6) the franchisee's operations are substantially dependent
on the franchisor for the continued supply of goods or services. Garlick,
supra at 838.

10. Briarcliff Candy Corp. v. Commissioner, 475 F.2d 775, 782 (2d Cir.
1973).
11. See Houston Natural Gas Corp. v. Commissioner, 90 F.2d 814 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 722 (1937); Gauley Mountain Coal Co. v.
Commissioner, 23 F.2d 574 (4th Cir. 1928); Manhattan Co., 50 T.C. 78
(1968); X-Pando Corp., 7 T.C. 48 (1946) (advertising is ordinarily deductible under § 162, but may be a capital expenditure in nature when expended for development of business benefit in future years). Goodell-Pratt
Co., 3 B.T.A. 30 (1925); Colonial Ice Cream Co., 7 B.T.A. 154 (1927) (new
markets or channels of distribution give rise to a capital expenditure,
however, court treated as ordinary expense because of lack of proof as to
what part of expense should be capitalized). Northwestern Yeast Co., 5
B.T.A. 232, 238 (1926) (part of promotion expense gives a benefit beyond
one year and is partially a capital expenditure, but once again, because of
lack of evidence, court found no part could be segregated but said that
segregation in a proper case is possible).
12. 475 F.2d 775 (2d Cir. 1973).
13. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 162(a) provides for a deduction of all
"ordinary and necessary expense paid or incurred during the taxable year
in carrying on any trade or business, including-(1) a reasonable allowance for salaries or other compensation for personal services actually rendered; (2) travelling expenses . . . in the pursuit of a trade or business;

and (3) rentals or other payments required to be made as a condition to
the continued use or possession, for purposes of the trade or business, of
property to which the taxpayer has not taken or is not taking title or in
which he has no equity".
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penditure must: (1) be paid or incurred during the taxable year;"
(2) be for carrying on any trade or business;'" (3) be an expense;"
(4) be a necessary expense;' 7 and (5) be an ordinary expense.'" The
fact that an advertising campaign '" extends for more than a year
does not change the rule that the cost is deductible.' However,
when advertising is directed at acquiring an asset with a useful life
of more than one year, the expenditure may not be deducted as an

ordinary business expense-but rather must be capitalized. "' Thus,
14. Commissioner v. Lincoln Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 403 U.S. 345, 352
(1971), rev'g 422 F.2d 90 (9th Cir. 1970).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. For cases interpreting and utilizing these concepts see Welch v.
Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 114 (1933) ("ordinary . . . does not mean that the
payments must be habitual or normal. .

.

. [t]hey may happen once in

a lifetime."); Helvering v. Winmill, 305 U.S. 79 (1938) (taxpayer not considered in business of selling and buying securities); Commissioner v. Tellier, :383 U.S. 687, 689 (1966) (the term necessary imposes "only the minimal requirement that the expense be 'appropriate and helpful' for 'the
development of the [taxpayer's] business.' "); Woodward v. Commissioner, 397 U.S. 572 (1970) (capital expense not ordinary expense); United
States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 397 U.S. 580 (1970) (court explains
Woodward case), Hill v. Commissioner, 181 F.2d 906, 908 (4th Cir. 1950)
(educational expenses of taxpayer treated as carrying on a trade or business and expenses were so vital as to be ordinary and necessary).
19. The tax court gave great emphasis to what it described an "intensive campaign to get new customers," citing Houston Natural Gas Corp.
v. Commissioner, 90 F.2d 814 (4th Cir. 1937), for the proposition that such
a campaign gives rise to a capital expenditure. However the court of ap-

peals disagreed, declaring that the term "intensive campaign" was inexplicit, and that the court would not enforce such a concept against the taxpayer where Congress and the IRS had failed to furnish clear standards "as
to what intangible assets are deductible under § 162 and what are not."
475 F.2d at 783.
20. For example, amounts paid in one year to an association of merchants for cooperative advertising over a period of five years were deductible in the year paid. Consolidated Apparel Co., 17 T.C. 1570 (1952). Where
large advertising expense exists, it is usually spread over the period of the
benefit, but due to the nebulous nature of future benefit, the tendency is
to allow the deduction in the year incurred. Rev. Rul. 561, 1968-2 CUM.
BULL. 117.

21.

United Profit Sharing Corp. v. United States, 66 Ct. Cl. 171 (1928).
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there is a distinction between general advertising designed to promote a product for current sale, which is deductible as an ordinary
business expense, and advertising designed to produce new means
of marketing a product, such as franchises and the like-which must
be capitalized.
In order to determine whether an expenditure is an ordinary business expense or a capital expense, courts have generally looked to
three criteria. First, will the benefit produced extend for more than
one year. Second, will a business advantage extending for more than
one year result. And lastly, was the expenditure made to acquire an
income producing asset.22 As one court has said:
ido constitute invested capital there must be a laying out of money and the
acquirement of something purposed to be of permanent use or value in the
business. Where money is expended merely for the purpose of maintaining
an exist ing asset the expenditure constitutes a current business expense, but
where money is spent to increase an asset such expenditure constitutes a
capital investment.' :

Extensive newspaper advertising, distribution of catalogs and promotion
of prize contests to obtain contacts on a new selling program had to be
capitalized; E.H. Sheldon & Co. v. Commissioner, 214 F.2d 655 (6th Cir.
1954), rev 'g 19 T.C. 481 (1952). Court allowed deduction for advertising on
the ground that expense could not be capitalized in the absence showing
with reasonable certainty the benefits resulting in later years from the
expenditure. But see Levin v. Commissioner, 219 F.2d 588 (3d Cir. 1955),
alf'g 21 T.C. 996 (1954). The IRS in Rev. Rul. 360, 1968-2 CuM. BULL. 197,
refuses to follow the Sheldon case and Harper & McIntire Co. v. United
States, 151 F. Supp. 588 (D. Iowa 1957), both of which held that the costs
were ordinary and necessary business expenses.
22. Houston Natural Gas Corp. v. Commissioner, 90 F.2d 814 (4th Cir.
1937); United States v. Wehrli, 400 F.2d 686 (10th Cir. 1968) (one year rule
of thumb is not absolute); Connecticut Light and Power Co. v. United
States, 299 F.2d 259 (Ct. Cl. 1962) (disbursements made to acquire new
assets, either tangible or intangible, are not deductible as ordinary and
necessary expenses incurred in carrying on a trade or business); Schultz
v. Commissioner, 420 F.2d 490 (3d Cir. 1970) (charges normally deductible
as ordinary and necessary are not deductible when incurred as integral part
of capital transaction). See also Willcuts v. Minnesota Tribune Co., 103
F.2d 947 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 577 (1939); United States v.
Pfister, 205 F.2d 538 (8th Cir. 1953); E.H. Sheldon and Co. v. Commissioner, 214 F.2d 655 (6th Cir. 1954).
23. Peerless Stages, Inc. v. Commissioner, 125 F.2d 869, 871 (9th Cir.
1942) (citations omitted). See also United States v. Akin, 248 F.2d 742, 744
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These criteria have been applied to cases similar to Briarcliff. In
several cases involving expenditures made by newspapers to increase circulation, the courts have held that the circulation structure constituted an intangible asset of good will, and thus expenditures made to increase the circulation were capital expenses. 4 The
court reached a similar conclusion in Carl Re.imers Co. v.
Commissioner.5 Here an advertising agency had spent several thousand dollars expanding into newspaper advertising. Reimers attempted to deduct these expenditures as an ordinary business expense. The court disallowed the deduction and noted that in order
to expand into newspaper advertising Reimers "was faced with the
necessity of making certain non-recurrent payments to put itself in
shape to do that. They were not made for the purpose of protecting
or retaining what the petitioner already had, but to fulfill a prerequisite to the attainment of something new."" The same problem
7
has arisen in the debtor-creditor situation. Welch v. Helvering"
involved a commission agent who paid debts of a bankrupt corporation which had borne his name and of which he had been secretary.
Although the debts had been discharged, the corporation's creditors
were prospective customers of the agent. The court held that the
(10th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 956 (1958).
24. Meredith Publishing Co. v. Commissioner, 64 F.2d 890 (8th Cir.
1933) (magazine circulation is treated as an intangible capital asset. Court
held that the cost of obtaining new magazine subscriptions was not ordinary and necessary expense); Gardner Printing Co., 4 B.T.A. 37, 39-40
(1926) (perhaps the most important asset of a news publishing business is
its circulation structure); Public Opinion Publishing Co. v. Jensen, 76 F.2d
494 (8th Cir. 1935) (expense to increase subscriptions through contests
and prizes held not deductible as ordinary and necessary expense).
Compare Journal of Living Publishing Corp., 3 T.C. 1058 (1944), with
Perkins Bros. Co. v. Commissioner, 78 F.2d 152 (8th Cir. 1935) (soliciting
subscriptions to maintain circulation structure held to be deductible as
ordinary and necessary expense). See also Newspaper Printing Co. v. Com-

missioner, 56 F.2d 125 (3d Cir. 1932) (cost of eliminating competition and
acquiring goodwill).
25. 211 F.2d 66 (2d Cir. 1954).
26. Id. at 68. The court continued, saying, "[w]ithout the payments,
the petitioner would have been unable to get credit and commissions, and
it would have been unable to operate profitably in the new field." Id.
27. 290 U.S. 111 (1933).
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payments were capital investments and not ordinary business promotion expense.
The appellate court in Briarcliff" followed these precedents21 in
holding that "where the taxpayer adds to its regular business of
making and selling a product, a new branch or division designed to
make and sell a different product," there is a capital expenditure."
However, the court departs from the earlier cases and draws a new
distinction between tangible and intangible expenditures. Whereas
courts previously talked of these two in the same breath, the court
in Briarcliff takes great care to separate them: "[wihere . . . the
contributing factor is intangible and it enhances an intangible capital asset of the new division of the same established company, the
boundary line between a taxable capital asset and a deductible
ordinary and necessary expense, incurred in carrying on a business,
becomes imprecise." :" According to the appeals court, where an in28. 475 F. 2d 775 (1973).
29. See notes 22-27 supra and accompanying text.
30. 475 F.2d at 781. The court in reviewing the facts found that the
changes made in Loft's internal organization to spread its sales into a new
territory were not comparable to the acquisition of a new branch or division
to make and sell a different product, but rather only to "stimulate" its
sales department. No deduction has been allowed for "pre-opening" expenses incurred between the decision to establish a business and the actual
beginning of business operations, even when claimed as ordinary and necessary start-up expenses. Richmond Television Corp. v. United States, 345
F.2d 901, 905 (4th Cir. 1965). Expenses incurred prior to and for the purpose of reaching a decision whether to establish a business are indisputably
capital expenditures. See Westervelt, 8 T.C. 1248 (1947); accord, Walet,
31 T.C. 461 (1958), aff'd, 272 F. 2d 694 (5th Cir. 1959) (per curiam). See
also, Fleischer, The Tax Treatment of Expenses Incurred in Investigation
for a Business or Capital Investment, 14 TAX L. REV. 567 (1959). The fact
that an expenditure is imposed compulsorily by law upon a taxpayer does
not in and of itself make that payment an ordinary and necessary expense
within the meaning of section 162(a) of the 1954 Code. Commissioner v.
Lincoln Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 403 U.S. 345, 359 (1971). Compulsory accounting rules do not control tax consequences. Old Colony R.R. v. Commissioner, 284 U.S. 552, 562 (1932).
31. 475 F.2d at 781. In the construction of a shopping center, part of
the "overhead expenses, including officers salaries, other overhead salaries, depreciation, insurance, legal and audit expenses, office
expenses. . .[must] be capitalized." Id. at 784, citing Ben Perlmutter, 44
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tangible contribution is made to a tangible asset, for example, an
engineer's supervision in the construction of a new building, his
salary is a capital expenditure. But where there is an intangible
contribution to an intangible asset, for example, a sales manager
contributes "25% of his time to devising a new or different method
of attracting customers, "' 2 the deductibility rests upon whether or
not "the new method is a 'capital' asset . . . ."I' Briarcliff was
viewed as presenting an intangible contribution to an intangible
asset.
The fundamental question confronted by both the tax court and
the second circuit was whether the franchise contracts in Briarcliff
were ordinary or capital expenses. The Commissioner claimed that
the contracts were capital expenses for they "provided the taxpayer
with a certain suburban market for the duration of the contracts." 34
Moreover, the Commissioner claimed that the means employed" in
obtaining the franchises and the five year term of the franchise
agreements, when viewed in light of the three criteria discussed
earlier, made the advertising expenditures a capital expense.
The court of appeals rejected this analysis " and applied the standard established by the Supreme Court in Commissioner v. Lincoln
Savings and Loan Association.7 At issue in Lincoln Savings was
whether additional premiums paid under compulsion of federal law,
which might result in a future benefit, were deductible as an ordiT.C. 382 (1965), aft'd, 373 F.2d 45 (10th Cir. 1967). "It is obvious that the
court is talking about intangible contributions to 'tangible' assets; not
'intangible' contributions to 'intangible' assets." Id.
32. 475 F.2d at 784.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 781.
35.

These included: (1) Creation of a separate division to procure sales

outlets in suburban areas; (2) Intensive campaign towards this end; (3)
Advertising directed not at ultimate consumers but to potential distributors; (4) New outlets to stem the decline in operating profits. But see
section 263(a)(2). This section states that no deduction shall be allowed
for "any amount expended in restoring property or in making good the
exhaustion thereof for which an allowance is or has been made." INT. REV.
CODE OF 1954, § 263 (a)(2).
36. "Prior to 1971 this was an often repeated and generally applied
standard." 475 F.2d at 782.

37.

403 U.S. at 354.

NOTES

19741

nary expense. The Supreme Court held that the possibility of future
benefit was not controlling-rather "[wihat is important and controlling . . . is that the . . . payment serves to create or enhance

. . . what is essentially a separate and distinct additional
asset. . .

."I'

The court of appeals construed the "separate and

distinct additional asset"3 standard as meaning that the asset must
be measurable in money's worth-that is, money or fair market
value. An expense should not be capitalized if it merely creates a
favorable expectancy or increases sales and produces income.4" In
reaching this conclusion the court reasoned that the franchise and
agency contracts were nothing more than contracts of employment 4'
for a term of years,4" and that the cost of obtaining them was not a
capital but rather an ordinary business expense.4" Yet if this is the
38. Id.
39. Id.

40. 475 F.2d at 784. Lincoln does not extend specifically this far.
41. But see Jones v. Corbyn, 186 F.2d 450 (10th Cir. 1950).
42. Robert E. Foxe, 53 T.C. 21, 25 (1969) (payment for termination of
employment was ordinary income and not a sale of a capital asset).
Compare Commissioner v. Pittston Co., 252 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1958), rev'g
26 T.C. 967 (1956), and Aircraft Mechanics Inc., 30 T.C. 1227 (1958), where
the court held that the payment for termination of an exclusive sales
representative's contract, a one year contract renewable on a year to year
basis was found not to be a sale or exchange of a capital asset, with Elliot
v. United States, 431 F.2d 1149 (10th Cir. 1970) where the payment for
termination of a general insurance agency contract was held to be a reimbursement for the loss of future earnings and was taxable as ordinary
income.
43. While the regulations make no reference to franchises as depreciable items, they are treated as falling within the definition of intangibles
referred to therein. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3 (1960); Jones v. Corbyn, 186
F.2d 450 (10th Cir.), aff'g 42 Am. Fed. T.R. 1199 (W.D. Okla. 1950). When
used in a trade or business they may be depreciated over the term of the
franchise or contract, Automatic Heating & Cooling Co., 11 P-H 1942
B.T.A. MEM.
42,561, at 1449, unless they have an indeterminate or
indefinite life in which case no depreciation is permitted, Louise R. Jones,
12 CCH TAX CT. MEM. 1437 (1953). In the year they are abandoned or
become totally worthless, their cost is deductible as a loss. An unlimited
franchise, or one which may be renewed periodically at the option of the
holder, cannot be depreciated because its duration is indefinite and unlimited. Rev. Rul. 520, 1956-2 CUM. BULL. 170. However, the rule should
not be applied when the franchise can be terminated at a specified date
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case, it is difficult to understand why the parties made the contracts
by either party. Automatic Heating and Cooling Co., supra. In the case of
Jones v. Corbyn, supra, the court was confronted with an exclusive insurance agency agreement. The court held that while the investment underlying the contract was slight, its principal value lay in pxpected future
agent's commissions for services to be rendered and thus found the agreement to be a capital asset. In this case, the Commissioner contended that
the contract was not a capital asset, but "nothing more than an employment contract to perform services . . . and granting to them the privilege
of soliciting insurance for the company . . .it is not property which is
susceptible of ownership for a length of time as is a share of stock or a bond;
and upon termination of the contract all the company received and paid
for in advance was a promise by the agency not to exercise this privilege
Iof soliciting insurancel." 186 F.2d at 452. However, the court found that
the contract had substantial value because it was capable of producing
income for its owners and could be bought and sold. "The implication of
this decision is that the employee without a contract must be satisfied
with ordinary income regardless of the disposition he makes with respect
to future services, but if he can protect his future earnings with a contract

then he is eligible for capital gains treatment." 3-B MERTEN'S LAW OF
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 22.34, at 310 (1973). To the extent that
Jones is inconsistent with Wiseman v. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing
Co., 301 F.2d 654 (10th Cir. 1962), it is overruled in the tenth circuit.
Accord, Maryland Coal & Coke Co. v. McGinnes, 225 F. Supp. 854 (E.D.
Pa. 1964), aff'd, 350 F.2d 293 (3d Cir. 1965). In Mansfield Journal Co. v.
Commissioner, 31 T.C. 902, 910 (1959), it was stated that the doctrine of
Jones v. Corbyn has been overruled by the Supreme Court in Corn Prod.
Ref. Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46 (1955). See also, Rev. Rul. 374,
1955-1 CUM. BULL. 370, in light of Maryland Coal & Coke Co. The fifth
circuit in Bisbee-Baldwin Corp. v. Tomlinson, 320 F.2d 929, 934 (5th
Cir. 1963), rejects the rationale of Weaver Realty v. Commissioner, 307
F.2d 897 (10th Cir. 1962) which had followed Jones and instead follows
its earlier ruling in United States v. Eidson, 310 F.2d 111 (5th Cir. 1962).
In Commissioner v. Starr Bros., 204 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1953), rev'g 18 T.C.
149 (1952), the court cites Jones and agrees with the dissenting opinion
of Judge Phillips. In Starr, the tax court held that the agency was a
capital asset, but the court of appeals followed Beals' Estate v. Commissioner, 82 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1936), which held that payment received for
a covenant not to engage in a competitive business was ordinary income,
not capital gain. 204 F.2d at 674. The courts when dealing with agency
type cases under section 117 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, have
generally followed the construction of a capital asset as set down in Corn
Prod. Ref. Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46, 52 (1955) which held that
since section 117 "is an exception from the normal tax requirements of
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for a period of five years, unless they wanted to receive a benefit for
that period. Moreover, if, as the court of appeals states, Briarcliff's
purpose was simply to obtain employees, the company could have
paid commissions on sales as it did for its other sales personnel,
rather than entering into franchise contracts.
The court cites Queens City Printing Co. v. Commissioner,4" for
the proposition that recruitment expenses are deductible. But
Queens City involved travel by the taxpayer to hire employees, who
could quit at any time. In Briarcliff, the travel was to solicit distributors, who were locked into agency agreements. 5 Moreover, Briarcliff was attempting to attain sources of income for at least five
years.
An interesting parallel exists between Briarcliff and Darlingtonthe Internal Revenue Code, the definition [therein] of a capital asset must
be narrowly applied" and the exclusions therein from the general definition
of' a capital asset "interpreted broadly" in order "to effectuate the basic
congressional purpose." See also Commissioner v. Gilette Motor Transp.
Inc., 364 U.S. 130, 134-135 (1960), which dealt with the temporary taking
of' a taxpayer's right to use his own transportation assets; and Commissioner v. P.G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260 (1958), dealing with the sale of oil
payment rights. In both cases the Supreme Court found there was no sale
or exchange of a capital asset. In General Artists Corp. v. Commissioner,
205 F.2d 360 (2d Cir. 1953), af'g 17 T.C. 1517 (1952), cert. denied, 346 U.S.
866 (1953), a divided tax court (five'judges dissented following the rationale of Jones at 17 T.C. 1524) when dealing with the narrow construction of
a capital asset under section 117, refused to follow Jones and held that
there was no capital asset where the taxpayer was a booking agency which
had exclusive booking contracts to another booking agency for a consideration consisting of a percentage of the earnings to be derived from the
bookings arranged by the latter. The court refused the example of a possible conversion of income from future services into capital gain. For a thorough case history of the principal authorities on both sides of the issue of
whether a capital asset exists, see Commissioner v. Ferrer, 304 F.2d 125,
130-32 (2d Cir. 1962). As Judge Friendly noted in Ferrer,in all cases where
a capital asset was found to exist, "the taxpayer had something more than
an opportunity . . . by dealing with another . . . or by rendering services
• . .or by virtue of ownership of a larger 'estate' . . . ." Id. at 130-31.

44. 6 B.T.A. 521 (1927).
45. It has been held that if Briarcliff had wished to terminate the
agreement and paid the agents for such termination, the compensation to
the agents would be extraordinary income under a theory of future income
turned into present income and thus not the sale or exchange of a capital
asset. Elliot v. United States, 431 F.2d 1149 (10th Cir. 1970).
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Hartsville Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. United States." In DarlingtonHartsville, the district court held that an expenditure is a capital
outlay if' it brings about the acquisition of a business advantage
extending into the indefinite future. Darlington involved payments
by the franchisee bottling company to its franchisor, the Coca-Cola
company. These payments were made in order to eliminate a middleman's contract, thereby permitting direct contracts with the
franchise owner. The court held the expenditure to have been made
for an intangible asset-a business advantage 7-and therefore capitalization was required.
Briarcliff obtained at least two advantages through its franchise
system. First, the channels of marketing distribution had a future
publicity benefit. Second, although the court of appeals claims that
Briarcliff's sales remained the same4" after the contracts went into
effect, the fact is that they would have declined were it not for these
contracts.' " Moreover, Briarcliff spent a great deal of money in es46. 273 F.Supp 229 (D.S.C. 1967), aff'd, 393 F.2d 494 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 962 (1968).
47.

273 F. Supp at 231.

48. 475 F.2d at 779. "The entire expenditures for and efforts of the
franchise division made very little change in net sales." Id.
49. Id.
Fiscal
Year

Number of
Agencies

19581
I159
1960
1961
1962
1963
19611
1965
1966
1967
1968
19t;9
19710
a.

.lite

1591)
490
846
1186
1380
1360
1465
1640

Franchise
Division

Other

Total

400,729
1,645,462
2,692,244
:3,516,812
:3,855,340
3.507,244
3,432,995
2,901.799c
3.301,616

17,334,310
17,690,409
18,380,263
17,601.868
17,061,929
16.128,649
15,143,061
14,459,572
14,503,729
14,824,558
14,009,960
13,284,191
15,257,689

17,334,310
17,690,409
18,380,263
17,601,868
17,462,658
17,774,111
17,835,305
17,976,384
18,359,069
18,331,802
17,442,955
16,185,990
18,559,305

Percentage of Sales
From
Franchise
Other
Division

2.3
9.2
15.1
19.5
20.9
19.1
19.7
17.9
17.7

100
100
100
100
97 7
90.8
84.9
80.5
79.1
80.9
80.3
82 1
82 I

30.

Ih. Of the original 159 agencies in 1962. 120 or 75"; were still under contract in 1969.
c. 11,vJanory I, 1969 Briarcliff's management had decided to terminate the agency
I.ont ract s.
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tablishing its franchise program, which the company would not
have done if it did not think that something of value would be
obtained.' Briarcliff helped to ward off the threat of financial decline by entering into contracts which produced between 17 and 21
percent of its income, at a time when its urban sales were declining.
In this respect Briarcliff is similar to Nachman v. Commissioner,"'
where the court held that an expenditure made to acquire an intangible asset, which was reasonably expected to serve the taxpayers
through future years, was not deductible as ordinary income.
Because the court felt that the status of the law regarding intangi2
ble contributions to intangible assets was hopelessly confused,5 it

50. In 1962 the Commissioner valued the franchise contracts at the
value of the advertising campaign, $212,028. However, when Loft's was
sold in 1971 to Barricini Stores, Loft's received $10,000 for a group of
assets, to wit, "trademarks and tradenames, usable inventories, customer
lists, agency contracts, manufacturing formulae, standards, guidelines and
other production knowhow, and a portion of its plant equipment and
machinery." 475 F.2d at 779. The court gave considerable weight to the
$10,000, of which the agency contracts represented only a fraction, and
criticized the Commissioner's 1962 capitalization of $212,028 to acquire the
contracts. (The total expense of the franchise division in 1962 was $332,869
of which the Commissioner claimed $212,028 was for promotional
expenses. 31 CCH TAX CT. MEM. 173 (1962). However, there is never any
guarantee that an item will not depreciate in value from one year to the
next, and even less of a guarantee when there is a lapse of eight years. The
record does not indicate the total consideration paid by Barricini Stores
to Loft's, but such information could pierce the $10,000 value assigned by
the parties, at a time when various financial and tax considerations were
paramount in the minds of the parties, and reveal a different consideration
for the contracts. In addition, in 1970 while this case was pending Briarcliff
could have expected, if an asset were finally determined to exist, to sell it,
either recouping its investment or sustaining a loss. (An unlimited or renewable franchise at the option of the holder cannot be depreciated. Rev.
Rul. 520, 1956-2 CUM. BULL. 170. However, this rule should not be applied
when the franchise can be terminated at a specified date by either party.
Automatic Heating & Cooling Co., supra note 43. P-Losses incurred upon

the loss of useful value or abandonment of franchises are deductible in the
year sustained. Rev. Rul. 581, 1954-2 Cum. Bull. 112.)
51. 191 F.2d 934 (5th Cir. 1951); accord, Shutler v. United States, 470
F.2d 1143 (10th Cir. 1972) (case focuses on acquisition of and renewal
privileges in a lease).
52. 475 F.2d at 785.
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castigated the IRS for resting many decisions in this area on "administrative fiat, fortified by the requirement that the taxpayer
show clear error."- :' The IRS was put on notice that the nebulous
standard regarding intangibles would not be accepted; "[t]he
taxpayer, who may be exposed to interest and penalties for guessing
wrong, is entitled to reasonably clear criteria or standards to let him
know what his rights and duties are." 4
However laudable this pronouncement, this language raises an
important question-whether the burden of proof is shifted in this
area from the taxpayer to the Commissioner, 5 obligating him to
show the creation of the asset." If the court is not totally shifting
the burden of proof, it is at the very least holding the taxpayer to a
minimal burden of rebutting the presumption that the Commissioner is correct. 7 The court of appeals found that the tax court
could not have concluded that a capital asset was created if it had
applied the appropriate body of law. However, taken as a whole, the
evidence presented by the Commissioner created a question of fact,
even in light of Lincoln Savings.x Since the tax court ignored the
Lincoln Savings case, and failed to state clearly the measurement
of the asset created, it left the door open to a more liberal view of
the facts. Had the Lincoln Savings case been applied by the tax
court, the court of appeals may have been barred from reversing the
tax court's determination, by the holding of Commissioner v.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. The burden of proof has been held to be upon the taxpayer to prove
that an item should be charged to expense if the Commissioner treats it
as a capital expenditure. Dane County Title Co., 29 T.C. 625 (1957); Challenge Mfg. Co., 37 T.C. 650 (1962); Delores Bussabarger, 52 T.C. 819
(1969); Davee v. United States, 444 F.2d 557, 567 (Ct. Cl. 1971).
56. 475 F.2d at 785.
57. The cost of retaining old customers is a deductible business expense, but the burden of allocating the expenditures between retention and
acquisition of new customers is upon the taxpayer, and in the absence of
proof the whole amount is not deductible. 4-A Merten's supra note 43,
§ 25.23 (1973).

58. Speaking for the Lincoln Savings majority, Justice Blackmun implied that the "separate and distinct" asset rule should not be considered
an absolute rule but should be applied in the absence of other factors. 403
U.S. at 354. The Court did not elaborate on what factors might alter the
result.
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Duberstein.)' In this case the Supreme Court held that primary
weight concerning issues of fact is to be given the conclusions
reached by the trier of fact. The judge's findings, where the trial has
been without a jury, must stand unless "clearly erroneous. ' ' 0
None of the grounds offered by the court in support of its holdings
are particularly compelling. Indeed, many cases have reached different conclusions in analagous situations. However, one analysis
which may support the court's holding, and mentioned by the court
in its conclusion, is that Briarcliff was not expanding into new markets but was merely following its old customers. As the court stated
in Peerless Stages Inc. v. Commissioner,' the maintenance of old
customers is an ordinary expense, but expenditures to acquire new
customers is a capital expense.62 Indeed, the court in Briarcliffmade
specific note of the flight from the citiesand the demographic
changes which have led to the growth of the suburbs. This implies,
of course, that Briarcliff was selling to a somewhat identifiable class
of customers, and expenditures made to maintain one's position
among a given class of customers is an ordinary and necessary business expense.
The second circuit limited the effect of its decision to the urban
relocation situation. " The court did not decide whether the result
might be different if a company is seeking additional sales growth
without the urban relocation factor. Thus, the door is still open for
the IRS to distinguish Briarcliff on this ground. In Briarcliff, the
courts have taken cognizance of the demographic trend of our society, and by indirect tax law subsidy, have helped the businessman
follow his customers to the greener pastures of the suburbs.
59. 363 U.S. 278 (1960).
60. Id. at 291. The Court further held that a finding is clearly erroneous
when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the
entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake
has been committed. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a). See also E.H. Sheldon & Co.
v. Commissioner, 214 F.2d 655, 658-659 (6th Cir. 1954) (since tax court
drew conclusions from uncontradicted facts without any element of seeing
or hearing the witnesses or judging their credibility, the court of appeals
could thus make its own evaluation of the conclusions to be drawn).
61. 125 F.2d 869 (9th Cir. 1942).
62. Rev. Rul. 181, 1956-1 CUM. BULL. 96, where a new sales territory was
entered but expense was allowed because the promotion expenses were so
directly related to the carrying on of the corporation's business.
63. 475 F.2d at 787.

LANDLORD-TENANT LAW-Tort Liability-Elimination of
Landlord Freedom from Liability. Sargent v. Ross, 308 A.2d 528
(N.H. 1973).
Defendant landlord appealed from a judgment holding him liable
for the death of tenant's daughter as a result of a fall from an
outdoor stairway at the leased premises. The Supreme Court of New
Hampshire, affirming the jury verdict, concluded that "now is the
time for the landlord's limited tort immunity to be relegated to the
history books where it more properly belongs."'
The freedom of the landlord from responsibility for conditions
existing at the time of the lease is based in early English common
law. The lease was regarded as a sale of the demised premises for a
term.' Consistent with the general approach taken in cases of sales
of chattels and realty, courts imposed on the purchaser the duty to
inspect the premises before purchasing his interest. Thus, the lessee
was presumed to have taken the premises with knowledge of all
discoverable defects. The landlord was held not liable for injuries
resulting from such defects.' This rule of caveat lessee was not uniformly applied in all American jurisdictions. As early as 1896 the
Supreme Court of Tennessee in Hines v. Wilcox 4 held a landlord
liable in tort for injury to a tenant on the grounds that there is an
affirmative duty on the part of the landlord to discover and remedy'
defects existing at the time of transfer of property to the tenant.
This duty to inspect and repair arises out of a common law duty of
care. As the Tennessee Supreme Court noted: "The ground of liability upon the part of the landlord when he demises dangerous prop1. Sargent v. Ross, 308 A.2d 528, 533 (N.H. 1973).
2. Harkrider, Tort Liability of a Landlord, 26 MICH. L. REV. 260, 261
(1928) [hereinafter cited as Harkrider].
3. Clarke v. Sharpe, 76 N.H. 446, 83 A. 1090 (1912); Finney v. Steele,
148 Ala. 197, 41 So. 976 (1906) (child of tenant); Valin v. Jewell, 88 Conn.
151, 90 A. 36 (1914); Bowe v. Hunking, 135 Mass. 380 (1893); Newman v.
Sears Roebuck & Co., 77 N.D. 466, 43 N.W.2d 411 (1950); Campbell v.
Elsie S. Holding Co., 251 N.Y. 446, 167 N.E. 582 (1929).
4. "We think the great weight of authority is that, if a landlord lease
premises which are at the time in an unsafe and dangerous condition, he
will be liable to his tenant for damages that may result, if he knows the
fact and conceals it, or if, by reasonable care and diligence he could have
known of such dangerous and unsafe condition." Hines v. Wilcox, 96 Tenn.
148, 160, 33 S.W. 914, 916 (1896).
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erty has nothing to do with the special relationship of landlordtenant. It is the ordinary case of liability for misfeasance which runs
through all the relations of individuals to each other."'
Landlord freedom from responsibility in tort also extended to
injuries caused by unsafe conditions that came into existence after
the beginning of the term of the lease. At common law, in the absence of agreement to the contrary, the landlord had no duty to
repair rented premises during the term of the lease.' As the landlord
was under no duty to repair defective conditions that developed or
were created by a tenant after he entered into possession, it was
generally held that the landlord was not liable in tort for injuries
proximately caused by them.7
Certain exceptions to this general rule of non-liability have become generally accepted by American courts. A landlord is held
liable to the tenant, his family, guests and others who enter in the
right of the tenant 8 for defective and dangerous conditions in the
premises even after he has surrendered control to the tenant, if the
injury results from a hidden defect unknown to the tenant, and the
landlord is or should be aware of such defect. 9 The knowledge re5. Wilcox v. Hines, 100 Tenn. 538, 548-49, 46 S.W. 297, 299 (1898). For
a look at present Tennessee law in light of the Wilcox cases, see Noel,
Landlord's Tort Liability in Tennessee, 30 TENN. L. REV. 368 (1963).
6.

Hunkins v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 86 N.H. 356, 169 A. 3 (1933).

7. Schafer v. Mascola, 163 Cal. App. 2d 53, 328 P.2d 796 (1958);
Anderson v. Valley Feed Yards, Inc., 175 Neb. 719, 123 N.W.2d 839 (1963);
Cullings v. Goetz, 256 N.Y. 287, 176 N.E. 397 (1931); Avron v. Plummer,
132 N.W.2d 198 (N.D. 1964); Kauffman v. First-Central Trust Co., 151
Ohio 298, 85 N.E.2d 796 (1949); W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 63, at 400
(4th. ed. 1971) [hereinafter referred to as PROSSER].

8. Kayler v. Magill, 181 F.2d 179 (6th Cir. 1950) (employee); Ames v.
Brandvold, 119 Minn. 521, 138 N.W. 786 (1912) (guest); Anderson v.
Hayes, 101 Wis. 538, 77 N.W. 891 (1899) (employee); RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS 358 (1965). Recent cases in several jurisdictions have widened the category of those who enter in the right of the tenant by abolishing
the common law categories of entrants onto real property. Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant,- Inc., 469 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (abolished all categories of entrants onto real property); Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108,
443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968) (abolished the distinctions between
licensees-invitees and social guests).
9.

Anderson v. Shuman, 257 Cal. App. 2d 272, 64 Cal. Rptr. 662 (1967);

Miner v. McNamara, 81 Conn. 690, 72 A. 138 (1909); Smith v. Green, 358
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quired before the landlord will be charged with responsibility for a
latent defect varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.'" The Tennessee cases are an extension of the latent defect exception to the rule
of caveat lessee in that they place a positive duty on the landlord
to inspect the premises for such defects at the beginning of the
term."
A second exception to the landlord's immunity exists where he
has negligently repaired the premises and such negligent repair
causes injury.' 2 A landlord may also be subject to liability for defects
existing at the time of transfer where the premises are leased for
public use,' : but this exception relates primarily to commercial
premises and not to private dwellings.' 4 In some states it is also
essential to show that the premises have been rented to serve the
public, or large numbers of persons,' 5 and that the premises have
been rented for consideration.'"
Mass. 76, 260 N.E.2d 656 (1970); PROSSER § 63, at 401.
10. Comment, Control by Landlord . . .How Much Is Necessary to
Hold Him Liable? 21 ALBANY L. REV. 86 (1957), Note, 35 IND. L.J. 361, 363
(1960).
11. Noel, supra note 5, at 375.
12. Finner v. Nichols, 175 Mo. App. 525, 157 S.W. 1023 (1913); Hunkins v. Ameskeag Mfg. Co., 86 N.H. 356, 169 A. 3 (1933); Rowan v. Ameskeag Mfg. Co., 79 N.H. 409, 109 A. 561 (1920); Barham v. Baca, 80 N.M.
502, 458 P.2d 228 (1969); "The tenant does not have to prove that by the
negligent making of the repairs what was wrong has been made worse. His
case is made out when it appears that by reason of such negligence what
was wrong is still wrong, though prudence would have made it right."
Marks v. Nambil Realty Co., 245 N.Y. 256, 259, 157 N.E. 129, 130 (1927);
Szczepkowicz v. Khelshek Realty Corp., 280 App. Div. 524, 113 N.Y.S.2d
870 (1st Dep't 1952); 1 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 105 (3d ed. 1939);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 362 (1965); PROSSER § 63, at 410-12;
Note, 35 IND. L.J. 361 (1960); Harkrider, supra note 2, at 268.
13. Colorado Mortgage Inv. Co. v. Giacomini, 55 Colo. 538, 136 P. 1039
(1913); Junkerman v. Tilyou Realty Co., 213 N.Y. 404, 108 N.E. 190 (1915);
Fitchett v. Buchanan, 2 Wash. App. 965, 472 P.2d 623 (1970);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 359 (1965); PROSSER § 63, at 403-05.

14.

Areal v. Home Owners Loan Corp., 43 N.Y.S.2d 538 (Sup. Ct.

1943); PROSSER § 63, at 403-05.
15. Campbell v. Elsie S. Holding Co., 251 N.Y. 446, 167 N.E. 582
(1929).
16. Junkerman v. Tilyou Realty Co., 213 N.Y. 404, 108 N.E. 190 (1915);
Davis v. Schmitt Bros., 199 App. Div. 683, 192 N.Y.S. 15 (2d Dep't 1922).
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If none of these limited exceptions applies, results turn on the
basic assumption on which the landlord's freedom from responsibility is based, i.e. he has given up control over the area where the
injury occurred. 7 For example, landlords have generally been held
liable where an area is adjudged to be within their control as in the
case of common stairways. "$
The responsibility for the condition of the premises is also affected by statute in some jurisdictions. Certain statutes explicitly
give the tenant a right to sue in tort;" others create a duty in the
landlord to repair leased premises;" and a third group creates an
obligation to repair but places the duty neither on the landlord nor
the tenant.2'
The New York Multiple Dwelling Law,22 and the Tenement House
Law23 which it replaced, imposed a duty on the landlord to repair
leased premises. In 1922 the court of appeals found a landlord liable
t7. Black v. Fiandaca, 98 N.H. 33, 93 A.2d 663 (1953); Flanders v. New
Hampshire Say. Bank, 90 N.H. 285, 7 A.2d 233 (1939); Dick v. Sunbright
Steam Laundry Corp., 307 N.Y. 422, 121 N.E.2d 399 (1954).
18. Chalfen v. Kraft, 324 Mass. 1, 84 N.E.2d 454 (1949); Menard v.
Cashman, 94 N.H. 428, 55 A.2d 156 (1947); People v. Scott, 26 N.Y.2d 286,
258 N.E.2d 206, 309 N.Y.S.2d 919 (1970) (agreement of landlord to repair
absent reservation of a right of entry does not result in landlord's control
for purposes of finding him liable for defective conditions in the premises);
Geesing v. Pendergrass, 417 P.2d 322 (Okla. 1966); PROSSER § 63, at 40508.
19. GA. CODE. ANN. §§ 61-111, -112 (1935); LA. CIv. CODE. ANN. arts.
670, 2322, 2693, 2694, 2695 (West 1952). For a discussion of the Louisiana

provisions, see Comment, Responsibility of Landlordand Tenant for Damages from Defects in Leased Premises, 20 LA. L. REV. 76 (1960).
20. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 125.471 (1967); N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW.

§ 78 (McKinney 1946); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 101.11 (1973). A discussion of
the difficulties encountered in founding tort liability on the basis of landlord repair statutes is beyond the scope of this note. For a detailed summary, see Feuerstein and Shestack, Landlord and Tenant-The Statutory
Duty to Repair, 45 ILL. L. REV. 205 (1950). See also Annot., 17 A.L.R.2d
704 (1951).
21. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 5-101 et seq. (1956). Clark v. O'Connor, 435

F.2d 104 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Whetzel v. Jess Fisher Management Co., 282
F.2d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
22. N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW § 78 (McKinney 1946).
23. Law of Apr. 12, 1901, ch. 334, [1901] N.Y. Laws 983.
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for injury to a tenant resulting from a breach of this duty.24 Justice
Cardozo justified the result as follows:
We may be sure that the framers of this statute, when regulating tenement
life, had uppermost in thought the care of those who are unable to care for
themselves. The Legislature must have known that unless repairs in the
rooms of the poor were made by the landlord, they would not be made by
anyone. The duty imposed became commensurate with the need. The right
to seek redress is not limited to the city or its officers. The right extends to
25
all whom there was a purpose to protect.

The right of the tenant to recover under the New York statute has
been limited by two prerequisites. The tenant must show the landlord's actual or constructive knowledge of the defect that resulted
in injury '1 and the absence of contributory negligence or assumption of the risk. 7
The trial in Sargent centered around the plaintiff's attempts to
prove that the landlord retained control over a private stairway. In
its affirmance, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire declined the
invitation to strain the control test to its limit, recognizing that the
landlord's control was never sufficiently established to justify a verdict in favor of the plaintiff. 2 The court also chose not to widen the
repairs exception to include negligent construction of improvements
to the premises. 29 It concluded that such decisions, while technically
justifiable, would only tend to "perpetuate an artificial and illogical
rule."3 " Instead the court eliminated the control test altogether com24.
25.
26.
27.
1939).

Altz v. Lieberson, 233 N.Y. 16, 134 N.E. 703 (1922).
Id. at 19, 134 N.E. at 704.
Id.
Weiss v. Wallach, 256 App. Div. 354, 10 N.Y.S.2d 69 (1st Dep't
The wisdom of applying the common law doctrines of contributory

negligence and assumption of the risk without modification seems ques-

tionable since tenants often lack the freedom of choice the doctrines assume. Often compliance with the rule of care would require the tenant to
vacate the defective leasehold. This seems an unreasonable burden to
place on the tenant. Note, 62 HARV. L. REV. 669, 677 (1949).

28. "The plaintiff does not directly attack this rule of nonliability but
instead attempts to show, rather futilely under the facts, defendant's control of the stairway." 308 A.2d at 530.
29. Id. at 533. The stairway in question had been added by the landlord
to the premises some eight years prior to the accident. Id. at 531-32.
30. The rule the court is referring to is that of landlord tort immunity.
Id. at 531.

FORDHAM URBAN LA W JOURNAL

[Vol. II

menting that "the control test is insufficient since it substitutes a
facile and conclusive test for a reasoned consideration of whether
due care was exercised under all the circumstances." 3' Hence "the
issue of control is relevant to the determination of liability only
insofar as it bears on the question of what the landlord and tenant
reasonably should have believed in regard to the division of responsibility for maintaining the premises in a safe condition."32
The court attempted to justify its departure from the existing
common law on a number of grounds. First, it considered evidence
of the need to change the present rule. Judge Hillsborough pointed
out the injustice of landlord immunity and the inadequacy of the
exceptions where strict application would result in a situation where
no one would be liable for the death of the plaintiff's daughter.3
Further, he argued that the state has a duty to safeguard the public
from injury by assigning responsibility to some party for the care of
structures capable of causing injury. 4 Finally, under the existing
law a landlord was in fact discouraged from remedying dangerous
conditions "since his repairs may be evidence of his control." 3"
In addition to citing a number of its own decisions eliminating or
refusing to adopt certain tort immunities," the court also referred
31. Id.
32. Id. at 532. One limitation on the landlord's liability is specifically
noted. "A landlord, for example, cannot fairly be held responsible in most
instances for an injury arising out of tenant's negligent maintenance of the
leased premises." Id. at 531. The implications of this crucial sentence are
not, however, further clarified in the decision.
33. Id. at 532. See also the dissent of Justice Bazelon in Bowles v.
Mahoney, 202 F.2d 320, 326 (D.C. Cir. 1951) (Bazelon, J., dissenting).
34. Note, 7 CORNELL L.Q. 386, 388 (1922): "One has merely to consider
at the present time the number of crowded tenement houses in cities,
which are in many cases occupied by people who are so poor that they are
unable to care for themselves, to see the desirability of the landlord's being
obliged to keep such buildings from falling into such a state of decay and
dilapidation." See generally Quinn & Phillips, The Law of LandlordTenant: A Critical Evaluation of the Past with Guidelines for the Future,
38 FORDHAM L. REV. 225 (1969).

35. 308 A.2d at 532.
36. Hurley v. Hudson, 112 N.H. 365, 296 A.2d 905 (1972) (sovereign tort
immunity disapproved); Dean v. Smith, 106 N.H. 314, 211 A.2d 410 (1965);
Briere v. Briere, 107 N.H. 432, 224 A.2d 588 (1966) (parental tort immunity
abolished); Welch v. Frisbie Memorial Hosp., 90 N.H. 377, 9 A.2d 761
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to recent cases in other jurisdictions modifying the common law
status of entrants onto real property." The inference was drawn that
the considerations which required changes in landlord immunity in
those cases also apply "where there is foreseeability of substantial
harm landowners, as well as other members of society, should generally be subjected to a reasonable duty of care to avoid it."3
The cases cited in Sargent that appear most clearly analogous are
39 and Presson v. Mountwo Arizona decisions, Cummings v. Prater
tain States Properties,Inc."' Cummings involved a suit by a tenant
for personal injuries caused by tripping over a concrete slab. The
plaintiff claimed she had no knowledge of the condition at the time
of the accident. The Arizona court stated that the question revolved
around "whether the condition of the slab was of such a nature that
in the exercise of ordinary care the defendant was under a duty to
warn plaintiff of its existence or to repair the condition."'" While the
court imposed a duty on landlords to meet a standard of ordinarycare by inspecting leased premises at the beginning of a term for
conditions that may be unreasonably dangerous, it seemed to maintain the rule that disclosure of such defects fulfills the duty of the
landlord to his lessee. In other words, the common law "warn or
repair" rule was maintained in conjunction with a limited duty to
inspect. 2
(1939) (charitable tort immunity not adopted); Gilman v. Gilman, 78 N.H.
4, 95 A. 657 (1915) (husband's tort immunity from wife declared abolished
by married woman's act). 308 A.2d at 533. Hurley approves the retention
of sovereign immunity for governmental functions.
37. Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc., 469 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1972)
(abolished categories of entrants onto real property); Mounsey v. Ellard,
297 N.E.2d 43 (Mass. 1973) (abolished licensee-invitee distinction). See
also Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561
(1968) (abolished the previous distinctions between licensees-invitees and
social guests).
38. 308 A.2d at 533. See also Note, ProductsLiability at the Threshold
of the Landlord-Lessor, 21 HASTINGs L.J. 458, 479 (1970) in which the
author suggests that Rowland may have imposed a liability of the landlord
based in negligence for injury resulting to a tenant or third party from a
latent defect in the premises.
39. 95 Ariz. 20, 386 P.2d 27 (1963).
40.

501 P.2d 17 (1972).

41.
42.

95 Ariz. at 23, 386 P.2d at 31.
Id.
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In Presson, an Arizona appellate court reversed a lower court
decision denying a cause of action to a tenant's nine year old child
who was severely burned due to a recurrently defective water heater.
Explicitly reserving the possibility of recognizing a warranty of habitability theory, the court extended the logic of Cummings by making the landlord potentially liable for injuries caused by his failure
to exercise a standard of care to maintain the premises free from
" 'unreasonably dangerous' instrumentalities that could potentially
cause injury."4 3 The court clearly held that a landlord who has
leased his premises for a short term has a common law duty to repair
any unreasonably dangerous condition, and that he is liable in tort
44
for his failure to do so.
Sargent differs from the Presson case in several ways. First, by
explicitly eliminating the special status of the landlord in regard to
his liability in tort and by relying upon a negligence theory, Judge
Hillsborough's opinion lays to rest any lingering doubts as to the
basis of liability. Secondly, the Sargent decision is not limited in its
application to short term leases as is the Presson ruling45 which, in
carving out an exception to the general rule of non-liability, uses
4
traditional landlord-tenant law concepts. 1
In recent years a number of state courts have adopted warranty
of habitability theories. 7 Under these theories a covenant to repair
43.
44.

501 P.2d at 19.
Id. As the Arizona appellate court explicitly rejected the option of

finding an implied warranty of habitability in short term leases Presson is

apparently not based on a breach of warranty theory. Id. at 20.
45. Id. Sargent does not even consider the possibility that where a long
term lease is involved the tenant may derive virtually all the benefit from
the construction and maintenance of permanent improvements.
46. Id. at 19. The Supreme Court of Arizona used the term "unreasonably dangerous condition" in the Cummings case which was within the
framework of the latent defect exception to the rule of caveat lessee. 95
Ariz. at 23, 386 P.2d at 31.
47. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970); Henson v. Delis, 26 Cal. App. 3d 62, 102 Cal.
Rptr. 661 (1972); Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969);
Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 Ill. 2d 351, 280 N.E.2d 208 (1972); Mease v.
Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791 (Iowa 1972); Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d
526 (1970); Morbeth Realty Corp. v. Rosenshine, 67 Misc. 2d 325, 323
N.Y.S.2d 363 (1971); Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409
(1961).
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on the part of the landlord is implied in the terms of each lease.4"
Recourse for any breach has been defined in terms of the familiar
contract remedies of damages, rescission or reformation.4 9 Courts
have not, to this point, allowed damages for personal injury nor does
it seem necessary or advisable that they do so. The use of the warranty theory is not necessary, as the difficulties that required extension of a contract theory to allow for what traditionally had been
considered tort recovery in the product liability field, do not seem
present in the landlord-tenant relationship. 5 ' Perhaps the greatest
tactical advantage available to a plaintiff under a warranty theory
is that contributory negligence is not a bar to recovery as it is in
those states that maintain a contributory negligence rule.5 However, traditional concepts of contributory negligence and assumption of the risk should be modified in the landlord-tenant area. In
any case, traditional interpretations of those doctrines could place
unrealistic and inequitable burdens on tenants. Under a more appropriate test, a tenant would rarely be found contributorily negligent, thus this advantage to the use of a warranty theory would
rarely come into play.53 Additionally, it seems preferable, where
possible, not to distort the traditional concepts of contract damages
but to use the more appropriate negligence route since the resulting
confusion of theories may have significant unforeseen ramifications.54 Hence, it seems advisable to respect the distinction in reme48.

Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, (D.C. Cir.), cert.

denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970).

49.
50.

Kline v. Burns, 111 N.H. 87, 91, 276 A.2d 248, 252. (1971).
Damages in contract have traditionally been limited to those fore-

seeable economic damages within the contemplation of the parties at the
time the contract was made. See Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145
(1845); DOBBS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 12.1, at 803-12
(1973).
51. As leaseholds do not pass through a chain of distribution of wholesalers, retailers, etc. there is little difficulty in proving that the landlord's
negligence resulted in the injury causing defect. See Prosser, The Assault
Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099,
1128 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Citadel].
52. Id. at 1147.

53.

See notes 27 supra and 72 infra.

54. "If there is to be strict liability in tort, let there be strict liability
in tort, declared outright, without an illusory contract mask." Citadel
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dies to the point that, in a proper case, a tort and a contract cause
of action could be brought against the landlord. 5
The court in Sargent suggested that its prior decision in Kline v.
6 which adopted
Burns"
a warranty of habitability theory may have
already created a basis for finding the present defendant liable in
tort." In Kline, the plaintiff sued for damages to recover rent paid
to a landlord for premises that were in violation of the Portsmouth
housing code.5" After taking note of the public policy of New Hampshire to make certain that residential premises are kept in proper
repair," the court suggested that the landlord is in a better position
to know the terms of existing housing standards and to make the
1134. The implications of such modification of a common law theory can
be far reaching. See, e.g., Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 25 N.Y.2d
340, 253 N.E.2d 207, 305 N.Y.S.2d 490 (1969) (personal injury cause of
action denied to a plaintiff who was injured more than 6 years after the
sale of defective goods).
55. Implicit in a warranty approach is the possibility of imposing strict
liability in tort on landlords in a further analogy to cases in the product
liability area. There is substantial question as to whether casual lessors
should be subjected to strict liability in tort. Hence, even if this rule were
adopted a negligence theory would be necessary as a basis of liability for
those not in the business of leasing property. See Note, Products Liability
at the Threshold of the Landlord-Lessor,21 HASTINcS L.J. 458, 467 (1970).
56. 111 N.H. 87, 276 A.2d 248 (1971).
57. 308 A.2d at 533-34. Evidently this decision would not bar a cause
of action for personal injury resulting from a breach of an implied warranty
of habitability.
58. PORTSMOUTH CODE OF ORDINANCES § 14 (1970), adopted pursuant to
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 48-A (1970).
59. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 48-A:2 (1970) provides: "Whenever the
governing body of any municipality finds that there exists in such municipality dwellings which are unfit for human habitation due to dilapidation,
dangerous defects which are likely to result in fire, accident, or other calamities, unhealthful lack of ventilation or sanitary facilities or due to
other unhealthy or hazardous or dilapidated conditions, including those set
forth in section 4 hereof, power is hereby conferred upon such municipality to adopt ordinances, codes, or by-laws to cause the repair, closing, or
demolition or removal of such dwellings in the manner herein provided."
"Our legislature has recognized (RSA ch. 48-A) that the public welfare
requires that dwellings offered for rental be at the beginning, and continue
during the tenancy to be, in a safe condition and fit for human habitation."
Kline v. Burns, 111 N.H. 87, 90, 276 A.2d 248, 251 (1971).

19741

NOTES

necessary repairs than the tenant." It also stated that the owner of
the reversionary interest in the property and its improvements is the
appropriate person to charge with their repair."' Finally, the court
recognized the superior bargaining position of the landlord in negotiating the terms of the contract.62 Hence, on public policy grounds,
sanctioned by indications of legislative concern, the court determined that "the above considerations demonstrate convincingly
that in a rental of an apartment as a dwelling unit, whether a
written or oral lease, for a specified time or at will, there is an
implied warranty of habitability by the landlord that the apartment
is habitable and fit for living." 3 As to the question of what standards are to be used to determine whether the premises are habitable or not the court concluded that "the existence of a breach is
usually a question of fact to be determined by the circumstances of
each case." 4
Not content with basing the landlord's liability in tort on the
implications derived from Kline 5 the New Hampshire Supreme
Court in Sargent held that, "[T]o the extent that Kline v. Burns
did not do so, we discard the rule of 'caveat lessee' and the doctrine
of landlord non-liability in tort. . . . Henceforth landlords must
6
exercise care not to subject others to unreasonable risk of harm."
60. 111 N.H. at 90, 276 A.2d at 251.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 92, 276 A.2d at 251-52.
64. Id. at 93, 276 A.2d at 252. Kline cites Reese v. Diamond Housing
Corp., 259 A.2d 112, 113 (D.C. Ct. App. 1969). In this case the court
determined that not all violations of the municipal housing code would
necessarily result in a breach of the implied warranty of habitability. 111
N.H. at 93, 276 A.2d at 252.
65. The court never addressed itself to the question of whether the
public policy considerations requiring the landlord to repair the premises
or be liable for contract damages are identical with those mandating his
liability in tort. The fact that insurance often covers the cost of tort injury
would seem to be a valid consideration in allocating the cost of tort injury
not present in most contract cases. See Bowles v. Mahoney, 202 F.2d 320,
325 (D.C. Cir. 1952); Eldridge, Landlord's Tort Liability for Disrepair,84
U. PA. L. REV. 467, 490 (1936); Note, Products Liability at the Threshold
of the Landlord-Lessor, 21 HASTINGS L.J. 458, 484-90 (1970); Note, 121 U.
PA. L. REV. 378 (1972).
66. 308 A.2d at 534. Evidently, in the proper case, a tort and a contract
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There are a number of questions left unanswered by the Sargent
decision. The first involves the scope of the landlord's duty to repair.
While the control doctrine is eliminated as determinative, the doctrine is not replaced with a specific formula for the division of responsibility. Offered in its place is "a reasoned consideration of
whether due care was exercised under all the circumstances."6 7 The
court does not choose to adopt, as have other jurisdictions, a duty
to repair co-extensive with applicable housing regulations." Since
the applicable New Hampshire standards may vary widely from
community to community within the guidelines prescribed by the
state enabling statute," the court was probably wise in not limiting
its discretion in this manner. Strict application of such a test might
force a court to choose between opposite determinations on virtually
identical fact patterns in adjacent communities or strained
interpretations of the applicable ordinances in the interest of equitable uniformity."
The decision leaves New Hampshire landlords and tenants in the
unenviable position of not knowing the extent of their duty to repair
until the court determines whether the parties acted as reasonable
men under the circumstances." While the decision is a significant
departure from the existing law its impact will not be clear until
further decisions implement this new rule. The decided cases do
not, for example, tell us whether the landlord has a duty to inspect
the premises for latent defects that have arisen after the beginning
of the leasehold term.72 Another important question left unanswered
cause of action could be brought against a landlord.
67. Id. at 531.
68. Id. at 534. Clarke v. O'Connor, 435 F.2d 104 (D.C. Cir. 1970);
Whetzel v. Jess Fisher Management Co., 282 F.2d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
69. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 48 A:12 (1970).
70. It is notable that even in jurisdictions with uniform housing regulations difficulties have arisen in the application of pre-determined stan-

dards. "Either the Housing Regulations were broadly interpreted . . . or,
more likely, the implied warranty of habitability was not limited to the
provisions of these regulations as it had been in Javins." Note, 45 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 943, 952 (1970).
71. In some respects their position is no different from any defendant
who does not know until a court decision whether his actions were "reasonable."
72. Assuming that the landlord has a right of entry to inspect for de-

1,9741

NOTES

is whether the court will bar or limit recovery of a plaintiff on the
basis of contributory negligence or assumption of the risk. While the
question was never reached in Sargent," the court suggested that
"the mere fact that a condition is open and obvious, as was the
steepness of the steps in this case, does not preclude it from being
"I'
unreasonably dangerous ...
Sargent represents an attempt to deal with fundamental questions of tort liability which are likely to be litigated in other jurisdictions . 7 The policy considerations enumerated are sound and the
negligence theory advocated by the court might well be emulated
by sister jurisdictions faced with similar questions. The disadvantages of using a negligence theory in cases involving personal injury
to tenants arise primarily from introducing a standard of reasonable
care into an area of the law where it has never been applied. On a
practical level, considering the present popularity of the warranty
of habitability theory, it may well be easier to convince precedent
conscious state courts to extend the warranty theory to include
damages for personal injury than to persuade them to repeal centu7
ries of common law decisions by adopting a negligence theory. 1
There are, however, several advantages to the negligence theory.
The jury will no longer be confronted with a confusing set of
technical exceptions77 to a rule of limited liability that has long
fects which he has a duty to repair, holding the landlord liable for his
failure to correct discoverable defects would seem to provide a reasonable
standard of care. See Note, 62 HARV. L. REV. 669, 676 (1949).
73. 308 A.2d at 529. The reason for this omission was apparently the
age of the deceased child. Id.
74. Id. at 532. Perhaps the best standard to apply in such cases would
be that "unless the danger is out of all proportion to the tenant's reasons
for continuing to use the premises, the tenant should not be said to have
voluntarily assumed the risk or to have been contributorily negligent."
Note, 62 HARV. L. REV. at 678.
75. As noted earlier, such litigation might well arise in those jurisdictions recently adopting a warranty of habitability theory. See note 55
supra.
76. Smith v. A.B.C. Realty Co., 71 Misc. 2d 384, 336 N.Y.S.2d 104
(Sup. Ct. 1972).
77. "The emphasis on control and other exceptions to the rule of nonliability, both at trial and on appeal, unduly complicated the jury's task and
diverted effort and attention from the central issue of the unreasonableness
of the risk." 308 A.2d at 533.
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outlived its time."M Rather, it will be faced with questions based
upon the familiar concepts of negligence. Instead of determining
questions of liability on the basis of a rigid system of established
rules or predetermined standards, courts will be able to determine
the duties of the parties in the light of all the facts peculiar to a
particular case. While this decision may result in a period of uncertainty for those affected, general delineations of responsibility
among those sharing interests in real property should become clear
once a body of case law develops.
78. "Considerations of human safety within an urban community dictate that the landowner's relative immunity, which is primarily supported
by values of the agrarian past, be modified in favor of negligence principles
of landowner liability." Comment, Torts-Abrogation of Common-Law
Entrant Classes of Trespasser,Licensee, and Invitee. 25 VAND. L. REV. 623,
640 (1972).

NEGLIGENCE-Intervening Criminal Act-Jury May Find
that Retail Store Which Cooperated With Armed Robbers
While Summoning Police by Automatic Silent Alarm Caused the
Death of a Customer Killed by a Robber. Kelly v. Kroger
Company, 484 F.2d 1362 (10th Cir. 1973).
Armed robbers entered a department store and forced the manager to open a safe. The employees followed store procedure and did
not give any verbal alarm for fear of exciting the robbers. After the
automatic activation of a silent alarm, the police arrived at the
store. A customer was then taken hostage by a robber and subsequently killed.' Decedent's husband brought a wrongful death action, based on negligence, against the store. He claimed that the
procedure adopted for use during a holdup, coupled with the use of
an automatic silent alarm, caused the death of his wife. Plaintiff
also claimed that the store should have had an armed guard on
duty.2
The trial court held that plaintiff failed to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted.3 The court of appeals reversed and
remanded for further proceedings, holding that a jury might properly find that actions of defendant during the holdup were negligent. The jury would have to determine whether the danger to the
decedent was evident to defendant's employees for a sufficient
length of time during the holdup.' The court did not rule on the
question of the effect of the store not providing an armed guard.'
In Kimple v. Foster,7 a tavern owner was found liable for injuries
inflicted on a patron by a gang of rowdies who had become drunk
and boisterous during an afternoon of drinking at the defendant's
establishment. The manager did not call the police before the attack
commenced, although plaintiffs and other patrons repeatedly had
told her to do so. The court in Kelly v. Kroger8 cited Kimple for the
proposition that a proprietor owes a duty of care to his invitees. This
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Kelly v. Kroger, 484 F.2d 1362, 1363 (10th Cir. 1973).
Id.

Id.
Id. at 1364.
Id.
Id.
205 Kan. 415, 469 P.2d 281 (1970).
484 F.2d 1362 (10th Cir. 1973).
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duty requires that the proprietor take affirmative steps to alleviate
a dangerous situation." Once the danger is apparent an unreasonable course of action by a defendant can subject him to liability."
The tavern manager in Kimple was confronted with unruly patrons
who had entered as invitees and become drunk on the beer she sold
them, threatening harm to other patrons. Although this situation is
significantly distinguishable from the case where armed gunmen
enter a store and eventually murder a patron, the court of appeals
treated the situation in Kelly simply as a variation of the usual
barroom drama." In citing Kimple, the court merely observed that
"[u]nder such circumstances, and as to business invitees, it should
make no difference whether the establishment is a tavern or a
store.","
The court also cited a New Mexico tavern case'3 to explain that a
proprietor can be liable even for an unforeseen attack on his customer. If the proprietor has sufficient time to comprehend the danger once the incident is in progress, he has a duty to act for his
patron's safety.'4 Since tavern cases involve unprovoked assaults on
a fellow patron, the proprietor does not face a choice between giving
the gunman what he wants or placing the customer in jeopardy by
attempting to resist or by secretly calling the police. The only apparent risk in choosing to act for a patron's safety in a tavern is that
the belligerent party will attack the proprietor instead of the
customer. The aggressor does not present the overwhelming potential force of an armed gunman.
In Kelly, the jury may find that the store employees should have
warned the customer or taken steps to protect her. To base liability
on the failure to warn, presumably the jury must find that the
decedent could not see for herself that a robbery was in progress;
that an employee had adequate time and opportunity to warn her;
9. Id. at 1364.
10. Id.
11. Fisher v. Robbins, 78 Wyo. 50, 319 P.2d 116 (1957); Greco v. Sumner Tavern, Inc., 333 Mass. 144, 128 N.E.2d 788 (1955); Winn v. Holmes,
143 Cal. App. 2d 501, 299 P.2d 994 (1956). See Annot., 70 A.L.R.2d 628
(1960).
12. 484 F.2d at 1364.
13. Coca v. Arceo, 71 N.M. 186, 376 P.2d 970 (1962).
14. 484 F.2d at 1364.
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and that thus warned, the presence of the gunmen would not have
prevented her from acting to save her life. 5
After noting that "there are several significant Kansas decisions
which . . .[consider] incidents which are somewhat similar,"'" the
court of appeals failed to analyze any cases in which the invitee of
a bank or retail store was injured during the course of an armed
robbery. In the leading bank robbery case, Sinn v. Farmer'sDeposit
Savings Bank, 7 a man handed a bank teller a note threatening to
detonate dynamite that he carried unless given money. Although
the bank officials had an opportunity to warn one of the bank's
customers, they failed to do so. Eventually the robber set off the
dynamite. The injured customer sued the bank and recovered on the
basis of the failure of the proprietor to warn his invitee of a known
hazard."
Even though it was improbable that the store could have protected the customer in any meaningful way (due to the presence
of armed gunmen), the court of appeals in Kelly concluded that the
plaintiff should have had an opportunity to develop the facts, and
that summary judgment should not have been granted. 9 Although
the court held that a jury question may exist, it is not clear whether
the possibility of recovery is limited to a finding that the employees
could reasonably have aided the customer during the holdup.20 If the
plaintiff in Kelly cannot point to any negligent act once the robbery
was in progress, the jury must find for the defendant. However, the
court did accept the plaintiff's contention that liability will properly
exist if the function of the automatic alarm during the holdup,
coupled with the employees' co-operation with the robbers, increased the hazard and caused the injury. The court avoided any
serious discussion of the foreseeability of the holdup by limiting
15. Sinn v. Farmers Deposit Sav. Bank, 300 Pa. 85, 150 A. 163 (1930).
16. 484 F.2d at 1363.
17. 300 Pa. 85, 150 A. 163 (1930), noted, 79 U. PA. L. REV. 368 (1931).
Cf. Laidlaw v. Sage, 158 N.Y. 73, 52 N.E. 679 (1899).
18. 300 Pa. at 91, 150 A. at 165. Although the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania recognized that the explosion was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries, it permitted a jury to find that the lack of warning was a
concurrent cause, a cause not so remote that, as a matter of law, a finding
for the plaintiff had to be reversed. Id.
19. 484 F.2d at 1364.
20. Id.
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possible liability to actions taken during the holdup.'
In later bank cases, injured customers have attempted to predicate a claim on the basis of a failure to take sufficient precautions
in anticipation of a robbery. Jurisdictions that have considered the
question have held that a bank will not be liable for a failure to
prevent a holdup from occurring." The very jurisdiction that decided Sinn has said:
It cannot seriously be contended that [the bank management] should have
anticipated that the bank would be invaded by bandits and their customer
subjected to the risk of being shot.23

A rule of law which states that banks cannot foresee holdups deprives a plaintiff of a chance to recover even if a bank's lack of
visible security virtually invites robbery. The better-reasoned cases
address the issue of the extent of a proprietor's duty of reasonable
care to his invitee.
In Burgess v. Chicopee Savings Bank" plaintiff was present when
a would-be robber shot a bank official. Plaintiff was shot when he
attempted to chase the man. He alleged that the bank was the cause
of his injury because it occupied an old building as temporary quarters and failed to provide guards or an adequate alarm system. The
court conceded that bank robberies are not uncommon:
But banks are not obliged to go to unreasonable lengths to prevent them.
They are required to exercise reasonable care to protect those who are upon
their premises to transact business. They are not insurers. . . Unless the
liability of a bank is to be virtually absolute-and we are not disposed to
impose such liability-there is no basis for recovery ....
11

The best discussion of the extent of the duty to exercise reasonable care to an invitee in anticipation of a robbery, and of a proprie21. Id.
22. Noll v. Marian, 347 Pa. 213, 215, 32 A.2d 18, 19 (1943); Nigido v.
First Nat'l Bank, 264 Md. 702, 705, 288 A.2d 127, 128 (1972); Burgess v.
Chicopee Say. Bank, 336 Mass. 331, 333-34, 145 N.E.2d 688, 690 (1957);

Altepeter v. Virgil State Bank, 345 Ill. App. 585, 104 N.E.2d 334 (1952).
23.
24.
25.

Noll v. Marian, 347 Pa. 213, 215, 32 A.2d 18, 19 (1943).
336 Mass. 331, 145 N.E.2d 688 (1957).
Id. at 333-34, 145 N.E.2d at 690. The failure to take precautions

cannot be considered the cause of the plaintiff's injury if it is merely
conjectural that the holdup could have been prevented. Id. See Nigido v.
First Nat'l Bank, 264 Md. 702, 705, 288 A.2d 127, 129 (1972).
26. Just as the law does not make the proprietor the insurer of his
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tor's liability for unreasonable conduct during a holdup, is found in
Genovay v. Fox.2" In the course of an armed robbery of a bowling
alley, plaintiff customer was shot when he attempted to prevent a
gunman from killing another customer. The court recognized that
the plaintiff was not precluded from recovering simply because the
harm was attributable to another's intentional act, and conceded
that an armed holdup of the premises was a foreseeable possibility.
The court observed that:
The critical inquiry, however, is whether it is debatably unreasonable conduct for the proprietor of an ordinary business establishment which is .. .
accessible to the general public .
to fail to take security measures against
the entry of an armed robber, in relation to the risk of injury to a business
invitee. . . .The inconvenience and expense of such precautions . . . so far
outweighs the probability of bodily harm to a business invitee from an armed
robber as to make it unreasonable . . . to put the proprietor to the trouble,
expense and business inconvenience of effective measures to keep the criminal out."
invitee's well-being, a plaintiff who tries to "waive the tort" and sue upon
an implied contract in order to impose strict liability will not succeed.
Altepeter v. Virgil State Bank, 345 Ill. App. 585, 593-94, 104 N.E.2d 334,
338 (1952).
27. 50 N.J. Super. 538, 143 A.2d 229 (App. Div. 1958), rev'd on the
particularfacts, 29 N.J. 436, 149 A.2d 212 (1959). The law of the case is
still valid. In a principal New Jersey case the appellate division is cited to
the effect that a landowner need not provide police protection in anticipation of the acts of criminal intruders. Goldberg v. Housing Auth., 38 N.J.
578, 585, 597, 186 A.2d 291, 294, 301 (1962). The duty of a proprietor can
be discharged "either by using reasonable care to protect the business
guests against the dangerous activity of the wrongdoers or, where such is
possible, by giving them warning adequate to afford the opportunity on
their part of assuming the risk of harm or protecting themselves by leaving
or remaining away from the land. In the absence of an adequate warning,
however, the possessor of the land may not only be under the duty of using
such ability as he has at the time to protect his business visitors, but if he
knows of the danger in advance, he must use reasonable care to be prepared to meet it when it becomes imminent." Harper & Kime, The Duty
to Control the Conduct of Another, 43 YALE L.J. 886, 903-04 (1934) (footnote omitted).
28. 50 N.J. Super. at 551-52, 143 A.2d at 236. The fact that alcohol was
sold on the premises does not increase the defendant's duty in this situation. Id. at 549, 143 A.2d at 234. In dictum, the opinion notes: "There may
• . .be kinds of businesses so attractive to armed gunmen, either because
of their nature (banks, etc.) or because . . .[they presentl good robbery
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With respect to defendant's conduct once the robbery was in progress, the court stated that although the social value of self-defense
or defense of property, coupled with the law's recognition of the need
to act instinctively in an emergency, excuses a negligent attempt to
resist an armed robber, liability could exist in the case of an intentional attempt to entrap the gunman, for
[tihere cannot be said to have been any right on defendant's part . . .to
take any measures he might choose to frustrate the gunman and secure his
capture without regard to the effect of such actions on the safety of the others
present. The social utility of such objectives was for the consideration of the
jury .. ..29

In Kelly the sending of the alarm did not represent an act done
on impulse in an emergency; the alarm was triggered automatically
when the safe was opened. Assuming that the sending of the alarm
was a proximate cause of the patron's death,'" the court of appeals
should have considered whether this effort to capture the gunmen'
was privileged as a defense of property or as an effort to summon
risks, as to reasonably require security measures for the protection of invitees." Id. at 552, 143 A.2d at 236. In the absence of a breach of a duty, the
court found it unnecessary to consider whether the failure to take further
precautions in advance of the robbery was a proximate cause of the plaintiffs injury. Id. at 555, 143 A.2d at 238.
29. Id. at 558, 143 A.2d at 239. But see Boyd v. Racine Currency Exch.,
Inc., - Ill.2d -, 306 N.E.2d 39 (1973). See also notes 33-43 infra and
accompanying text.
30. It plainly was a cause in the sense that but for the summoning of
the police the decedent would not have been taken hostage and killed.
Whether the chain of events made the installation of the automatic alarm
so remote as to preclude recovery as a matter of law is more a question of
policy than analysis. See Feezor & Favour, Intervening Crime and Liability for Negligence, 24 MINN. L. REV. 635, 642 (1940). Kansas recognizes the

foreseeability test as elucidated in Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y.
339, 344-45, 162 N.E. 99, 100-01 (1928). George v. Breising, 206 Kan. 221,
477 P.2d 983 (1970) (leaving car unlocked with keys in the ignition a remote
cause of unforeseen injury to a pedestrian after the car is stolen); Cooper
v. Eberly, 211 Kan. 657, 508 P.2d 943 (1973) (failing to lock gate a concur-

rent proximate cause of foreseeable harm when third party opened gate
and released horse into the path of plaintiff's automobile); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 448, 449 (1965).
31. In the absence of notice to the robbers that an alarm was present,

the potential deterrent effect of an alarm cannot be used as a justification.
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the police so that they could aid the store's employees and customers. To hold, as the court in Kelly did,3" that a jury might find that
during the robbery the danger to the decedent was apparent and the
wrong action was taken is probably correct, but the court's analysis
is insufficient because the silent alarm was set before the robbery
took place and was not activated by anything the store employees
did during the robbery. The court's opinion does not establish
whether a jury may base liability on the installation of the alarm.
If this is not permitted, the only apparent questions for the jury are
whether the employees should have warned the robbers of the presence of the alarm, or attempted to prevent the customer from being
taken hostage.
In Boyd v. Racine Currency Exchange, Inc.," a case decided after
Kelly, the Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed the dismissal of a
wrongful death action where defendant proprietor protected its assets from a robber at the expense of the life of a customer. The
currency exchange had placed its teller behind a bullet-proof shield.
A holdup man held a gun to a customer's head and threatened to'
kill him unless he was given money. When the teller refused to
comply and ducked beneath the counter, the robber killed the customer.34 Although the customer was exposed to an unreasonable risk
of harm, i.e. imminent death, the court held that a business proprietor has no duty to accede to criminal demands." The proprietor's
duty to warn the customer did not arise because she could see the
danger for herself once the holdup began.3" Although the opinion
purported to analyze several factors in reaching the decision,37 the
court stressed the harm that might occur if a proprietor faced civil
liability for refusing to pay to save a customer's life.
32. 484 F.2d at 1364.
33. __ Ill.2d __ , 306 N.E.2d 39 (1973).
34. Id. at
, 306 N.E.2d at 40.
35. Id. at __, 306 N.E.2d at 42.
36. Id. at
, 306 N.E.2d at 41.
37. Id. at __, 306 N.E.2d at 41-42. Imposition of a duty requires not
only foreseeability, but a consideration of "[tihe likelihood of injury, the
magnitude of the burden of guarding against it and the consequences of
placing the burden upon the defendant. . . ." Id. at -, 306 N.E.2d at
42, quoting Lance v. Senior, 36 Il.2d 516, 224 N.E.2d 231 (1967). In addition, "whether acquiescence [to the robber] would have spared the decedentis, at best, speculative." - Ill. 2d at __,
306 N.E.2d at 42.
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[To find a duty might] encourage the use of hostages for such purposes,
thereby generally increasing the risk to invitees. . . . [The proprietor]
would have little choice in determining whether to comply with the criminal
demand and surrender the money or to refuse the demand and be held liable
in a civil action for damages brought by . . .the hostage. The existence of
this dilemma and knowledge of it by those who are disposed to commit such
crimes will only grant to them additional leverage to enforce.their criminal
demands. The only persons who will clearly benefit from the imposition of
such a duty are the criminals."

The court thus finds a bank free of liability despite the unreasonable risk of harm faced by its invitee. It can be argued that defendant
in Kelly also created an unreasonable risk by failing to honor the
demands of the criminals. Although the employees were told not to
resist, the installation of the automatic silent alarm was an act
designed to thwart the robbery, and the sending of the alarm exposed the invitee to risk. ' " In any case, under the reasoning in Boyd
plaintiff has no hope of recovery unless the facts are such that the
customer could not see for herself that a robbery was in progress,
and missed an opportunity to escape because defendant failed to
warn her."
In weighing the interests of proprietor and invitee in a robbery
situation, another aspect favors the proprietor. The law recognizes
a privilege of self-defense, and excuses the use of force likely to cause
death or serious harm if reasonably needed to prevent the commission of a felony." In a five to three decision an Indiana court reversed
a jury finding that a tavern owner acted carelessly in attempting to
grab the gun from a robber's hand.4" The plaintiff in that case
brought suit on behalf of a customer who was killed after he
attempted to jump on the robber's gun in defense of himself and his
wife as the robber and the proprietor scuffled for the gun. The court
38.
__
Ill. 2d at -, 306 N.E.2d at 42. Judge Goldenhersh in his
dissent, sensibly states that: "The majority's polemic on the subject of the
hazards which would be created by an application of established legal
principles to this case finds little support in logic and none whatsoever in

the legal authorities." Id.
39. The unreasonableness of the risk in Kelly is less compelling than
that in Boyd because the police summoned by silent alarm come to aid the
invitee as well as to aid the proprietor.
40.
41.
42.

See notes 15-19 supra and accompanying text.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 143(2) (1965).

Yingst v. Pratt, 139 Ind. App. 695, 220 N.E.2d 276 (1966).
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characterized the tavern owner's actions as ordinary resistance, and
held him "justified, excused, and privileged." 43
Despite the privilege of self-defense, and the Boyd court's fear of
encouraging criminals, there does not appear to be any justification
for extending the self-defense privilege so that the installation of a
security device, like a bullet-proof shield or a silent alarm, should
be included if in fact it creates an unreasonable risk of harm to a
customer. Even though many cities sponsor civilian anti-crime programs,4" the public may be best served by requiring that an innocent
customer's interest be weighed against the desirability of protection
of property and the enforcement of the criminal law.
Unlike Boyd, Kelly creates a potential tort liability for a proprietor who acts unreasonably during a robbery in an attempt to preserve his property and thereby exposes a customer to harm. Kelly
is admirable for cautioning the proprietor that he must exercise
judgment even in summoning the police, but it fails to provide
strong guidance in delineating the interests which need be considered in making such a decision.
43. Id. at 699, 220 N.E.2d at 280. In Helms v. Harris, 281 S.W.2d 770
(Tex. Civ. App. 1955) (writ of error refused), the proprietor attempted to
grab the robber's gun and the robber shot the customer. The court held
that the proprietor could only be liable if the evidence were "clear and
convincing . . .that such resistance . . .involved unreasonable risk of
grave harm to innocent third persons. . . ." Id. at 773. See also
Schubowsky v. Hearn Food Store, Inc., 247 So. 2d 484 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1971) (armed resistance to violent crime justified and privileged).
44. A civilian anti-crime force in New York City will spend nearly
$360,000 on fences, lights, locks, alarms, etc. N.Y. Times, Sept. 8, 1973,
at 35, col. 1.

